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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis presents the perspective and basis for modeling of retail electricity price 
components in Germany. Detailed Python models are developed to provide predictions for 
yearly development of average network charges, EEG, StromNEV-19 and KWK surcharges 
for the period 2015-2035. For network charges and EEG surcharge, scenario-B (2035) from 
NEP2015 has been chosen as the model scenario. For KWK surcharge, the 2025 KWK share 
target, set by KWKG-2016, has been chosen as the model scenario. Individual component 
model results are validated against available academic literature and institutional reports. 
Model results for EEG surcharge, indicate an increasing yearly EEG costs till 2024, after 
which the expiring EEG plants of past will unburden the related high costs and EEG surcharge 
will drop but still be around 99% of 2015 level in 2035. Model results for network charges 
indicate a consistently increasing yearly trend owing to high grid investments needed for 
reaching the target RE share of 57%. KWK model results also indicate a growing KWK 
surcharge until 2020 which then would remain stagnant at that level onwards. All model 
results are collected under three consumption categories, namely, households, privileged and 
nonprivileged industries. The final results indicate that the average German household will 
face an overall increase of around 3.37 Cents/kWh in retail electricity prices (excluding VAT) 
till 2028, after which the retail prices will drop a little due to dropping EEG surcharge. The 
similar but slightly reduced trend can be seen for nonprivileged industrial consumption. The 
increment effect, however, is only minute for privileged industrial consumption due to high 
exemptions in EEG & KWK surcharges and reduced individual network charges.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Wuppertal Institute of Climate, Energy and Environment holds a strong research focus into 
German Energiewende and maintains several computer models relating to prediction of whole 
sale electricity prices and feed in from RE technologies. Furthermore, they have developed 
well researched future scenarios for RE development, policy directions etc. There was a need 
for in-house development of a model that can translate whole sale price predictions to retail 
price level with the help of existing model results and future scenarios. This master thesis has 
been executed in coordination with the institute to lay the ground work for a python model that 
would serve the above stated purpose. 
This thesis is divided into six sections. This section provides introduction to German retail 
electricity sector and latest electricity retail price statistics. Sections 2,3 and 4 provide 
perspective, model description and model calculation results for the retail price components 
modelled in python. Perspective part provides overview of historical developments, evolving 
mechanisms and context with renewable energy growth. The part of model description states 
the adopted modelling approach for the respective price component from year 2015 to 2035. 
In the subsequent sub-sections, calculation results are presented along with validations from 
external literatures. Section-3 relates to EEG surcharge. Section-4 relates to network charges 
and associated additional surcharges while section-4 relates to KWK surcharge.  Section-5 
provides the collective model results segregated across three consumer classes. Section-6 
relates the model concluded results to current social, political and technical affairs encircling 
electricity sector of Germany and Europe in general. A brief outlook on research gaps and 
possible future research opportunities linked to the model are also presented in section-6. 
1.1 Electricity Retail Sector of Germany 
Germany has a vertically unbundled market based electricity supply chain.  There are many 
market participants on electricity retail side. The retail market enjoys a low concentration with 
Herfindahl-Hirschmaasd Index (HHI) well below 1000, which is generally considered as an 
indication of a competitive market (Bayer, 2015). In 2016, BNetz’s monitoring report 
(BNetzA, 2016a) surveyed around 1,238 retail suppliers to get an average estimate of 
electricity price components charged to various consumer classes. According to that report, 
around 54.8% of network areas had above 100 operating retail suppliers.  
In Germany, small consumers, including households and small to medium businesses, are 
generally metered on non-interval basis. A two-part tariff structure is commonly used 
consisting of fixed base price and working price/kWh. Base price usually covers consumption 
independent costs of metering, billing, demand based part of grid charges per KW and retail 
supplier’s fixed costs. Working price contains all other energy dependent components. 
Introduction  Electricity Retail Sector of Germany 
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Consumer class with yearly consumption above 100MWh generally employ interval metering 
(BNetzA, 2016a). Such consumer can have time of use tariff. The key differences in this 
regard is that the consumer on interval metering tariff can be charged the time-based 
electricity procurement costs and the time of consumer’s load peak occurrence relative to 
system peak can significantly affect the peak charges (cents/KW) and consumer’s eligibility to 
exemptions in overall network charges. Other tariff methodologies are also employed in 
Germany but are rare (BNetzA, 2016a). 
For any consumer class, retail electricity price usually comprises of at least ten distinct 
components. Almost all components are not constant but vary depending on consumer class, 
supply area, eligible legal exemptions and time frame. They also differ with respect to nature 
of supply contract. Retail suppliers generally control less than one third portion of total retail 
electricity price which mainly comprise of energy procurement costs, delivery costs and profit 
margins. These costs are hereafter referred as ‘supply costs’. Some components, mainly 
network charges, billing/metering costs and concession fees, are regionally dependent based 
on regulated costs of regional Transmission System Operators (TSOs) & Distribution System 
Operators (DSOs), municipality taxation policies and meter operator costs. Other components 
comprising of surcharges and federal levies are calculated as per several legislative 
instruments and uniformly applied at the state level. Table 1.1 indicates the various retail 
electricity price components and their major controlling factors. 
Table 1.1 Electricity retail price components and major control factors 
Sr. No Price component Major Controlling 
Factors 
1 Network Charges Regionally based TSO & 
DSO regulated costs, 
Municipality based taxes 
2 Concession Fees 
3 Billing, Metering and Metering Operations 
4 EEG Surcharge 
State controlled 
mechanism of calculation 
at state level 
5 KWKG Surcharge 
6 19-StromNEV Surcharge 
7 Offshore Liability Surcharge 
8 Interruptible Loads Surcharge 
9 Electricity Duty 
10 VAT 
11 Electricity Procurement Cost 
Retail Supplier controlled 
buisness operations 
12 Supply Costs 
13 Supplier Margin 
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1.2 Latest Electricity Price Statistics 
To estimate the average retail electricity prices and components per kWh, BNetzA executes a 
yearly survey of retail supply industry where the retail suppliers are required to provide all 
types of retail costs on per kWh basis representing average of different tariff products based 
on regions, consumer types and contract types. The retail components are generally inquired 
against multiple consumer classes. This classification is mainly based on gross yearly 
consumption along with assumptions for peak load, full load hours and grid voltage level to 
which the consumer is connected. (BNetzA, 2016a) provided these statistical estimates using 
two non-household consumer classes and four household consumer classes. Non-household 
classes consisted of customers that consume annually above 24GWh (industry) and 50MWh 
(big businesses). Household classes consisted of customers having annual consumptions in 
ranges covering from below 1,000kWh to above till 10,000kWh. 
(BNetzA, 2016a) states that at industry level, specifically for 24GWh class (C-24GWh), the 
retail tariffs are frequently tailor made to suit the respective consumer needs. Price portion 
controlled by the retail supplier vary significantly based on contract nature which may cover 
full scale retail services or mere the service of balance responsibility at wholesale market 
level. Often the retail prices are indexed with wholesale price. Many times, the retail company 
is an affiliation of the consuming enterprise. Another characteristic of this consumption class 
is that many industries are eligible to wide range of exemptions on multiple regulated price 
components. 
Consumers with annual consumption at 50MWh or above (C-50MWh) usually represent 
medium to large business entities. In this category, (BNetzA, 2016a) states that the consumers 
are usually non-interval metered and presumably a standard load profile is frequently used. 
Contractual arrangements play less significant part here and standard rates are easier to 
estimate.   
At the household level many different tariffs exist, although not very divergent in cents per 
component, owing to two main parameters; annual consumption and supply contract type. As 
stated earlier, (BNetzA, 2016a) surveyed for four different consumption classes. It also 
categorized the supply contracts in three distinct types and explained the coverage nature of 
each type. The types of contracts are: 
1. Default supply contract 
2. Special supply contract with default supplier 
3. Contract with other supplier who is not the local default supplier 
Consumers usually switch from default contracts to special contracts or contracts with other 
non-local suppliers for reasons such as lower tariffs and security features like price stability 
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guarantee etc. Analyzing the data available in (BNetzA, 2016a), it can be easily observed that 
special contracts or contracts with non-local suppliers make lower tariffs by reducing supply 
costs thus overcompensating slight increases in costs of billing/metering and network charges. 
It can also be observed that electricity tariffs decrease from low to high consumption. The 
prime decrease occurs in tariff components such as supply costs, network charges and 
billing/metering. Figure 1.1 shows the average values of several price components for all four 
household consumer classes as of 1st April-2016. Only the components that vary across classes 
are displayed. It can be observed that total price decreases to 66.5% as we go from lowest 
consumption class to highest. 
Table 1.2 depicts the retail price components, as of 1st April-2016, for the two stated non-
household classes and a household class with consumption range of 2,500kWh – 5,000kWh. 
Values listed for 24GWh class are based on assumption of zero exemptions granted. Values 
listed for household class are volume weighted averages across all three supply contract types. 
 
Figure 1.1 Variable price components for default supply contracts across four household 
consumer classes on 1st April-2016 [Source: (BNetzA, 2016a)] 
 
The Figure 1.2 gives a comparative status of those price components across three consumer 
classes that are significant in value and vary across the classes. It can be observed that the total 
retail electricity price falls as we go from household class to industry class (around 56.6%). 
The prime decrease occurs in network charges, concession fees and supply costs. Network 
charges become low because industries often have asymmetric peak demand and are 
connected to high voltage networks which avoids downstream network costs. Concession fees 
are also less at transmission grid level owing to less territorial spread of the grid network. 
Supply costs decrease mainly due to bulk purchasing, consuming more during off peak periods 
and flexible contracts.       
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Table 1.2 Average retail price components across three consumer classes on 1st April-2016 
[Source: (BNetzA, 2016a)] 
Price Component C-2500/5000kWh C-50MWh C-24GWh 
Network Charges 6.11 5.5 2.03 
Concession Fees 1.65 0.35 0.03 
Billing, Metering and Metering Operations 0.68 0.93 0.11 
EEG Surcharge 6.35 6.35 6.35 
KWKG Surcharge 0.45 0.44 0.06 
19-StromNEV Surcharge 0.38 0.38 0.06 
Offshore Liability Surcharge 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Electricity Duty 2.05 2.05 2.05 
Supply Costs 7.35 5.15 3.48 
Total(Excl. VAT) 25.06 21.19 14.2 
 
In addition to the important variations in price components across consumer classes as shown 
in Figure 1.2, exemptions in certain price components applicable to energy intense industries 
can significantly change the overall electricity price for such consumers. For full eligibility 
cases, electricity duty and concession fees are fully exempted, while EEG surcharge, network 
charge and other surcharges can reduce by 92%, 80% and 44% respectively (BNetzA, 2016a). 
 
Figure 1.2 Significant electricity price components across three consumer classes on 1st April-
2016 [Source: (BNetzA, 2016a)] 
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2 EEG-SURCHARGE 
2.1 Perspective 
EEG surcharge or EEG-Umlage was first introduced as a component of retail electricity price 
in Germany in 2000, consequent to coming in force of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) Act 
or Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz (EEG) in 2000. (Gründinger, 2017) gave a comprehensive 
overview and context about historical EEG developments in Germany, often citing other 
references to explain the changes in EEG with time. Features of each EEG Act relevant to 
thesis scope are briefly highlighted in following text. The said source is consulted and referred 
as needed to understand the special features of each EEG version.  
2.1.1 Electricity Feed-In Act 
Before 2000, there was no EEG surcharge, however, the RE support scheme was still present 
under Electricity Feed-In Act (STrEG) of 1991. The law came in context to obstructing 
traditional grid companies and insufficient tariffs granted to RE plants based on averted costs 
(Gründinger, 2017). The author states that for the first time, STrEG-1991 enforced three 
pioneer market regulations mainly compulsory connection, priority feed in and guaranteed 
payments to RE power plants for 20 years. As per STrEG-1991, the payments were coupled 
with retail price of electricity, primarily setting the remunerations of wind and solar plants as 
at least 90% and other RE sources as 80% of average retail price of the year of 
commissioning. Compensation scheme required the local grid company to pay for the RE feed 
and recover it from its consumers. (Gründinger, 2017) states that STrEG-1991 brought a small 
but steady RE growth and laid the basis of several institutional structures. However, the 
remunerations under STrEG-1991 were still insufficient to cover actual costs and too volatile 
to ensure investment security. Additionally, the compensation scheme caused regionally 
unequal distribution of costs among grid companies even after a later enforced 5% cap which 
limited the maximum RE feed in obligations for grid companies.   
2.1.2 EEG-2000 
Extending the above stated three pioneer market regulations, EEG-2000 brought along some 
fundamental changes in tariff structures with strong focus on covering costs of operation of 
RE plants. Some of the highlighted changes were: 
1. An absolute feed in tariff differentiated across technologies, sizes and yields. 
Technology categories eligible for compensation were solar, onshore and offshore 
wind, biomass, geothermal and gas power plants using mine, sewage or landfill gas. 
Tariffs for biomass, geothermal and gas plants were linked to effective rather than 
nominal capacity.  
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2. An annual digression scheme that would decrease allowed feed in rates with time to 
incentivize cost reducing innovations.   
3. A country level equal distribution of EEG costs through a mechanism whereby 
regional grid companies would pay compensations to RE plant operators and equalize 
their costs among each other which would ultimately be recovered through EEG 
surcharge from consumers. 
4. A 51cents/kWh tariff for solar installations and supplementing low interest loan 
scheme, while putting a maximum solar deployment cap of 350MW and feed in 
eligibility limit of up to 100KW per installation. These limitations were removed later 
in 2003 in an amendment, where by tariff was differentiated w.r.t size and type of 
systems i.e. tariff for freestanding and rooftop installations and a bonus for building 
facade based solar installations. 
5. Tariff for wind was in two steps: initial high tariff and lower base tariff.  Default period 
of initial tariff for onshore and offshore plants were 5 years and 9 years respectively. 
To encourage installations in low yielding onshore areas, provisions for extension of 
initial tariff period were added linked with the gap of plant yield with a reference yield. 
6. An amendment in 2003 allowed a special equalization scheme whereby energy intense 
industries with consumption above 100GWh/annum were allowed to pay reduced EEG 
surcharge of 0.05cents/kWh in concern to their declining competitiveness in global 
markets, however under several eligibility conditions. 
EEG-2000 started an unprecedented growth in RE deployment and the overall share rose from 
6.2% in 2000 to 9.3% in 2004, although the original EEG target was doubling the share till 
2010 (Gründinger, 2017). 
2.1.3 EEG-2004 
After the founding structure laid down by EEG-2000, the revised version extended the 
previous provisions with increased tariff differentiations with respect to plant sizes and 
increased conditions. Some new additions that are relevant to modeling of EEG costs are 
stated below: 
1. Wind plants that replaced previous installations or expiring stock within same 
municipalities, now called ‘repowering’, were allowed higher extension periods in 
initial tariff then allowed for normal onshore wind plants that lagged the reference 
yield stated above. Offshore plants also enjoyed such extensions where it was based on 
distance from shore. Default initial tariff period for offshore plants was also revised to 
12 years.  
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2. New bonus system was introduced for all biomass plants that consisted of  
a. Fuel bonus differentiated with respect to plant size and fuel type to encourage 
use of crop residues and special energy crops over the then status quo old 
wood and cheaper organic waste (Gründinger, 2017). Since, biomass plants 
can usually operate on multiple fuel type, the individual fuel bonus was applied 
only to portion of generation resulted from that specific fuel consumption.    
b. Cogeneration bonus of 2cents/kWh for production amount in combined heat 
and power mode. 
c. Technology bonus of 2 cents/kWh for innovative technologies like fuel cells, 
organic Rankine cycle etc. 
3. Funding period for small hydropower plants up to 5MW was limited to 30 years. For 
bigger plants till 150MW, eligibility of support was only allowed for any increased 
capacity because of modernization for 15 years of period and differentiated with 
respect to increased capacity classes. 
4. Plants generating electricity using pipeline natural gas and replacing the same at some 
other grid point were included under EEG gas plant tariff schemes. There were further 
bonuses if the replaced natural gas was pre-processed or the generation plants are 
based on innovative technologies like Rankine cycle, fuel cells etc.   
2.1.4 EEG-2009 
By 2009, RE growth reached 16.3% of total generation and EEG costs more than doubled 
from 0.54 to 1.33cents/kWh (as per reference stated in (Gründinger, 2017)). These 
developments brought the focus of EEG revision to challenges of cost efficiency and grid 
integration. Some highlighted aspects of EEG-2009 were: 
1. Solar tariffs were reduced and digression rates were tightened and linked to yearly 
growth corridors, all in context to falling PV costs, rapid solar boom and high operator 
profits. A unique regulation was added that gave fixed 25.01 cents/kWh to solar plant 
operators for self-consumed electricity. This clause incentivized self-consumption until 
reaching of socket grid parity before next revision period of RES act in 2012, after 
which it was discontinued. Although it was a step toward futuristic self-reliant energy 
systems with less grid burden, some bodies strongly opposed because of negative 
effects of lesser grid cost recoveries, tax collection and disturbance in load profile 
planning (Gründinger, 2017).  
2. Wind onshore tariff was slightly increased in context to rising raw material costs but a 
gigantic leap from 4 to 13 cents/kWh was taken for offshore wind along with bonus of 
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2 cents if the plant came before 1st January-2016. A system services bonus of 0.5 
cents/kWh was allowed for onshore wind plants coming before 2015. It was meant for 
those plants that could maintain frequencies, reestablish supplies etc. Repowering 
onshore wind plants were give same amount bonus as well. 
3. Hydropower tariffs were significantly increased but the remuneration period was 
shortened from 30 to 20 years. 
4. Geothermal plants were allowed for cogeneration bonus and bonus for using petro-
thermal technology. 
5. An option for direct marketing was introduced where the plant owners could monthly 
inform the grid operators if they wanted to get feed in tariffs or do direct marketing. 
However, there was no incentive given for direct marketing. 
6. Grid operators were allowed RE curtailment for better grid management accompanied 
with equivalent financial compensation for the losses.  
(Gründinger, 2017) states that by 2009 - 2010, global solar prices had fallen rapidly and 
Germany was experiencing a solar boom and there were high profit margins enjoyed by solar 
producers. The resulting burden of EEG costs on consumers was also rising. At the same time, 
German solar industry had been facing financial troubles as the imported PV panels were 
outcompeting even the biggest of European solar panel manufacturers. In context to counter 
pulling concerns of avoiding huge EEG related costs and promoting solar industry to save 
jobs, PV act, 2010 came into force. It decreased the solar tariffs, however, enhanced the 
incentive for self-consumption, therefore the relief on EEG costs were not significant.  
2.1.5 EEG-2012 
This revision of EEG act came at a time when several important happenings were changing 
the energy course altogether. Fukushima accident of 2011 had made German government to 
reverse its nuclear power prolonging plans. Solar boom led to a quite significant rise in EEG 
costs where the situation came to a point that solar energy accounted around 56% of EEG 
costs but a mere 20% share in total EEG supply. Merit order effect, now much increased due 
to solar expansion, squeezed the profit margins of conventional generators and endangered the 
economic viability of gas power plants which depended on peak load times to earn revenues. 
EEG-2012 enhanced cost efficiency features and reduced complexity by embedding several 
bonuses to base rates. Some highlighted provisions as per (Gründinger, 2017) were: 
1. For accelerated growth of offshore wind power plants, a provision of increased initial 
tariff for only 8 instead of the default 12 years was introduced. Any plant operator 
could claim it from gird operator before plant commissioning. 
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2. Biomass bonuses were reduced in count and proportional remuneration was allowed 
for mixed fuel use. Conditions for eligibility of compensation were put that required a 
mandatory cogeneration or slurry use or direct marketing. 
3. Consumers who used grid electricity for storage to be later fed back to grid again, were 
exempted for EEG surcharge. Industrial consumers who consumed energy purchased 
via grid produced from own generating plant situated in spatial proximity were also 
exempted from EEG surcharge. 
4. For first time, a cost coverage mechanism was provided for direct marketing via 
market premium and management premium. Market premium was set as the difference 
between eligible EEG remuneration and average spot market price for corresponding 
month. Management premium was a top up given to compensate administrative costs 
of marketing and to cover market risk factor. In addition, direct selling biogas plants 
were given flexibility premium for ten years to be applied only to additional capacity 
offered for executing demand oriented operation. In this regard, additional capacity 
was required to be at least 0.2 times and considered only up to 0.5 times of the declared 
additional installed capacity. Flexibility premium was an incentive to increase demand 
flexibility of biomass plants through biogas storage development (Gründinger, 2017).  
5. As an incentive to consider grid situation at the plant installation location, it was 
provisioned to compensate RE plants till 95% monthly losses owing to RE curtailment. 
6. Solar tariffs were already reduced in the act but in context to rampant solar boom and 
EEG costs, an amendment act came to force which apart from further reductions and 
monthly digressions, also changed some fundamental structure for payment. Size 
classification was revised. Fixed entitlement of self-consumption was removed as the 
grid parity was already achieved. For market integration, solar plants from 10 to 
100KW were allowed EEG remuneration only till 90% of annual generation. 
Moreover, an absolute cap of 52GW was set above which no further solar capacity was 
to be remunerated. 
2.1.6 EEG-2014 
Revision of EEG-2014, came into force on 1st Jully-2014, brought some fundamental changes 
to RE support framework. Apart from regular decrease in allowed compensation rates, 
digression rates for biomass, onshore and offshore wind technologies were linked to yearly 
expansion targets as was done previously for solar technology. Some highlighted changes 
were: 
1. In contrast to previous default feed in support, direct marketing was set obligatory for 
all plants. Direct marking would enable plants to get market premium, which was in 
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fact the difference between average spot price and the fixed remunerations eligible to 
plants. Previously introduced management premium was merged into fixed 
remunerations. Small plants, without direct marketing, could enjoy fixed 
remunerations with little reductions on basis that no management costs were need for 
direct marketing. Other plants, in case of no direct selling, could also enjoy fixed 
remunerations but at 20% less rate. Therefore, there was a clear incentive to sell 
directly into the market and other option could be used for exceptional cases like 
insolvency etc. (Geipel, 2014). 
2. EEG act 2014 indicated that from 2017 onwards EEG remunerations would be decided 
based on competition through a tendering mechanism. Furthermore, it provisioned the 
mechanism of tendering for determining remunerations for freestanding PV plants 
which would also serve a learning experience in future.     
3. Self-suppliers that consumed electricity from own production without grid usage were 
subjected to percentage of EEG surcharge differentiated with respect to date and type 
of power plant. This provision was not applicable in several situations such as the self-
supplier is off grid, or generator existed before new EEG regime or generator is below 
10KW etc. 
2.1.7 EEG-2017 
As indicated in previous version of RES act, this revision extended the auctioning 
methodology onto biomass, onshore & offshore wind and all solar technologies. Some 
highlighted features, as per (BMWi, 2016a), are: 
1. Fixed gross capacities, preset by law, will be auctioned every year for solar, wind and 
biomass plants. Through auctions, fixed remunerations for above 750KW solar and 
wind plants will be determined. For biomass, the limit will be above 150KW. Rest of 
the plants will continue with remunerations prefixed by law as usual. The targeted 
yearly RE capacity under auctions will make around 80% of total annual capacities 
expected to be installed. All plants will continue with default market premium model 
as incorporated previously with minor changes. 
2. For geothermal, gas and hydropower technologies, there will be no auctioning schemes 
because of too little expected capacity expansion to suit competition. Therefore, there 
are no annual capacity caps as well (Agora, 2016).  
3. Grid status is strongly integrated with support mechanism. For example, in grid 
bottleneck areas, onshore wind newbuild will be restricted to 58% of average newbuild 
between 2013 and 2015. Serval expansion limits differentiated on yearly and regional 
basis are introduced for controlling and steering offshore wind expansion.  
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4. Existing biomass installations will be allowed for an additional follow up 10 years 
funding under auctions provided they fulfil the requirements of flexible and demand 
oriented generation capabilities. 
2.1.8 EEG surcharge exemptions 
After the introduction of special equalization scheme, mentioned in 2.1.2, the scheme has been 
amended several times. As per latest EEG-2017, following reductions are allowed in payable 
EEG surcharges: 
1. For two types of industries listed in annexure-4 of EEG-2017, reductions of EEG 
surcharge to either 15% or 20% is allowed in several cases. For eligibility, industry’s 
electricity cost intensity must be at least 14% or 15% for respective types. In all these 
cases, reductions apply above one GWh consumption while reduced surcharge must 
not be lower than 0.1 Cents/kWh with exception that few industries can get as low as 
0.05 Cents/kWh. Electricity cost intensity is defined as the ratio of means of electricity 
cost and gross value added for last three years. 
2. For railway consumers which consume over 2GWh, get 80% surcharge reductions on 
all consumption.    
2.1.9 Historical development of EEG surcharge 
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 show the yearly installed EEG capacities and energy production 
from 2003 till 2015. During this period, the overall installed capacity and energy arose more 
than 5 times. A particularly rapid increase in solar capacity started from 2009. 
 
Figure 2.1 Yearly installed capacities under EEG support [Source: (BNetzA, 2016b)] 
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Figure 2.2 Yearly electricity generation under EEG support [Source: (BNetzA, 2016b)] 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the yearly EEG costs per technology from year 2006 to 2015. During this 
period, the overall costs increased more than 3.5 times. It can be observed that the proportional 
share of solar costs in overall costs is much higher then as in energy generation.  
 
Figure 2.3 Yearly total EEG costs per technology [Source: (BNetzA, 2016b)] 
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2.2 Model Description 
As per exemptions mentioned in section 2.1.8, the developed model determines the base EEG 
surcharge for unprivileged consumers and privileged EEG surcharges for 15/20% categories 
for a target year by following relations: 
 𝐸𝐸𝐺𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 =
𝐶𝐷𝐹−𝐸𝐸𝐺×𝑓𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑛×𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑣
 (1) 
 𝑬𝑬𝑮𝟏𝟓%𝑺𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆 = 𝑴𝒂𝒙(
𝑪𝑫𝑭−𝑬𝑬𝑮×𝟎. 𝟏𝟓
𝑪𝒐𝒏
 , 𝟎. 𝟏) 
(2) 
 𝑬𝑬𝑮𝟐𝟎%𝑺𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆 = 𝑴𝒂𝒙(
𝑪𝑫𝑭−𝑬𝑬𝑮×𝟎. 𝟐𝟎
𝑪𝒐𝒏
 , 𝟎. 𝟏) 
(3) 
      Where: 
 CDF-EEG = Total EEG difference costs 
 Con= Consumption in target year (assumed same for all years as of 2015)  
 fcost= Factor to determine amount of CDF-EEG left after excluding revenues from privileged consumers  
 funprv=Factor to determine amount of Con left after excluding privileged consumption and including 
 equivalent portion of self-consumption subject to full base surcharge 
 (fcost and funprv are determined as 0.993 and 0.703 using 2017 prognose (TSOs, 2016a) while Con is 
 set to 488TWh as of 2015. All parameters are assumed non-variable for calculations of future years) 
 
Yearly EEG difference costs are modelled by following relation: 
 𝐶𝐷𝐹−𝐸𝐸𝐺 = 𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺 − 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑−𝑁𝐶 + 𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 (4) 
      Where: 
 CEEG =Revenues generated by RE plant owners with remunerations defined by applicable EEG Acts.  
 Rmarket= Total revenue generated by sale of EEG generation in wholesale market 
 RAvoided-NC= Total avoided network costs for energy generated by the decentralized EEG generators as 
 described in 3.1.4. This amount is not paid by DSOs to RE plant owners but to TSOs. 
 RCothers= Other components consist of account balance from previous year’s EEG account and an 
 additional 6% liquidity reserve costs which is needed by TSOs for paying EEG remunerations. 
 
Based on data in (BMWi, 2016b) for years 2015, 2016 and 2017 it is observed that previous 
year’s account balance and liquidity costs have a canceling effect. Since, balance account is 
not modelled, RCothers is assumed to be zero. RAvoided-NC depends on the upstream voltage 
network rates and the energy produced by EEG plants. Due to model limitations, no data is 
available on upstream network costs. Further, no big change is anticipated in RAvoided-NC as per 
model results available in (Oeko-Institut, 2016). Therefore, based on stated insignificance, 
RAvoided-NC is not modeled but locked at the level as of 2015 using data from (BMWi, 2016b). 
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For calculation of CEEG and Rmarket detailed modeling is carried out. A database of EEG power 
plants installed in Germany till 2015, originally available from (Energymap, 2017), updated 
by Wuppertal Institute is used. Data base provides information about applicable technologies, 
sub categories as per EEG for individual technologies and regional locations in terms of 
NUTS3 codes. In addition, hourly power curves for all technologies, developed by Wuppertal 
institute have been used. For Wind and Solar, these power curves are available for several 
regional coordinates based on regional weather data taken from Merra-NASA (Merra2 
Dataset). A separate data table that links Nuts3 locations with ids as per Merra data was also 
used. An exception was hit with wind offshore plants which needed special regional 
description which was not possible under NUTS3 ids. All such offshore plants were allocated 
applicable ids of Merra data based on a separate data set provided by the institute and specific 
park characteristics to which the plants belonged. CEEG and Rmarket for a target year are 
determined by following equations: 
𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺 = ∑ ∑ (∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑟×[(1 − 𝑀𝐹̅̅̅̅̅𝑃−𝑁𝑀)×?̅?𝑃−𝑁𝑀 + 𝑀𝐹̅̅̅̅̅𝑃−𝑁𝑀×?̅?𝑃−𝑀 + 𝐾𝐹×𝐼?̅?−𝐾𝑊𝐾]
𝑦𝑟
×𝐶𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑃−𝑓𝑐𝑡𝑟) × ∑ 𝑃𝐶̅̅̅̅ 𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑟
ℎ𝑟𝑗𝑖
 (5) 
 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑝
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟×𝑃𝐶̅̅̅̅ 𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟×𝑊𝑆𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ℎ̅𝑜𝑢𝑟
ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑖
 (6) 
      Where: 
  i: technologies [Wind onshore, Wind offshore, Solar, Geothermal, Biomass, Gas, Hydro] 
  j: Respective id of Merra data     yr: years from 1950 to target year     hr: hours in a year 
 𝐶𝑎𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟= Vector with all plant capacities of i-technology, j-region and eligible for EEG support 
  𝑀𝐹̅̅̅̅̅𝑃−𝑁𝑀= Vector containing plant marketing factors  
 ?̅?𝑃−𝑁𝑀= Vector containing applicable plant tariffs to be paid for non-direct marketed electricity  
 ?̅?𝑃−𝑀= Vector containing applicable plant tariffs to be paid for direct marketed electricity 
 𝐼?̅?−𝐾𝑊𝐾= Vector containing applicable increments for cogeneration based electricity (only biomass) 
 KF= Factor to exclude non-cogeneration related plant capacity (only biomass) 
 𝐶𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑃−𝑓𝑐𝑡𝑟= Vector with factors to decrease plant energy yield, commissioning or expiring in target year 
 𝑃𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟= Vector containing hourly capacity factors for i-technology and j-location  
  𝑊𝑆𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ℎ̅𝑜𝑢𝑟= Vector containing hourly whole sale price of electricity  
 --All vectors with subscript-P have parameters that correspond to plant capacities available in vector 
 𝐶𝑎𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  in same serial order 
 --Python model can take as input the vectors of 𝑃𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟and 𝑊𝑆𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ℎ̅𝑜𝑢𝑟based on years 2015, 2020, 
 2025, 2030 and 2035. Yearly calculations are executed using respective vector from nearest year 
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2.2.1 Development of plant tariffs 
As it is described in section 2.1, ever evolving EEG mechanisms gave diverse number of tariff 
schemes to EEG plants. The biggest challenge to work with plant data base was therefore, to 
determine tariff applicable to the individual power plants. Many entries in the plant data base 
came along with multiple EEG-keys. An EEG-key provides information to unique tariff level 
applicable to certain portion of electricity, certain technology and/or sub-category, EEG 
regime and bonus/non-bonus type.  All such data was available as excel file from 
(Netztransparenz, 2016), which contained around 4300 unique EEG-keys. Except wind tariffs, 
all technologies have tariff levels differentiated against capacity portions. The average default 
tariff per kWh is therefore determined. Following example gives a simplistic understanding of 
calculation of average default plant tariff. 
A solar plant installed on a building roof with capacity of 40KW in 2004 
 
Applicable tariffs: 
Tariff-1=T1=57.4 cents/kWh for 0-30KW with EEG-key=SoK111------04 
Tariff-2=T2=54.6 cents/kWh for 30-100KW with EEG-key=SoK112------04 
Calculations: 
Share-1 of installed capacity in 0-30KW=S1=
𝟑𝟎
𝟒𝟎
=0.75 
Share-2 of installed capacity in 30-100KW=S2=
𝟏𝟎
𝟒𝟎
= 𝟎. 𝟐𝟓 
Average Default Tariff in Cents/kWh= 𝑺𝟏×𝑻𝟏 + 𝑺𝟐×𝑻𝟐 = 𝟓𝟔. 𝟕𝟎 
In above example, installed capacity is used for solar case. However, for 
non-solar cases, effective capacity must be used.  
Python program was developed to determine average default tariff for each plant in the plant 
data base. Effective capacity is determined by dividing generation of 2015 (available with data 
base) by 8760 hours. Since, generation data for all plants was not available, capacity factors of 
applicable technology for year 2015 available from (BNetzA, 2016b) were used. By essence 
of above stated methodology, the higher is the plant capacity, lower is the plant tariff. Figure 
2.4 to Figure 2.10 show the results of the default tariff calculation model along with brief 
highlights of each illustration. Figures have limited horizontal axis (years) range and zoomed 
vertical axes to allow better visibility. 
For solar plants installed in years 2007 and 2008, two divisions between free standing and 
building solar plants can be clearly observed with former having lower tariff and no capacity 
dependence. Building solar plants show declining tariffs with increasing capacities. 
Subsequent years show complex interplay of increased digression rates mentioned in 2.1.5. 
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Figure 2.4 Solar plant tariffs (right) and installed capacities (left) ordered in ascending order of 
installation years and descending tariffs (zoomed vertical axis) 
For biomass plants, the results appear more complex due to interplay of several bonuses 
mentioned in 2.1.3. However, in each installation year, a clear division can be observed. The 
division is due to a fact that many biomass plants, available in data base, provided no EEG-
keys and basic tariff was allocated to these plants. Other biomass plants mostly contained keys 
corresponding to certain bonuses and got higher tariffs. Average default tariff for biomass 
plants with multiple bonus keys was determined using equal weightage to each bonus.  
 
Figure 2.5 Biomass plant tariffs (right) and installed capacities (left) ordered in ascending order 
of installation years and descending tariffs (zoomed vertical axis) 
For gas plants, installed in years before 2004, no bonuses were provisioned and the capacity 
dependence effect can be observed only. From 2004 onwards, gas plants were allowed 
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technology bonuses mentioned in 2.1.3. The effect of bonuses can be observed in terms of 
divisions in tariffs observable in years 2004 to 2010. 
 
Figure 2.6 Gas plant tariffs (right) and installed capacities (left) ordered in ascending order of 
installation years and descending tariffs 
For hydropower plants, simple tariff schemes are available. Capacity dependence effect and 
tariff divisions between new and modernized plants can be observed clearly. A particular 
aspect is that the average tariff falls significantly for few above 7MW power plants.    
 
Figure 2.7 Water plant tariffs (right) and installed capacities (left) ordered in ascending order of 
installation years and descending tariffs (zoomed vertical axis) 
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A stepped increase can be observed in geothermal plants with introduction of bonuses in 2009 
with implementation on plants installed after 2004, mentioned in section 2.1.5 and general 
tariff increase after 2012 as per EEG-2012. 
 
Figure 2.8 Geothermal plant tariffs (right) and installed capacities (left) ordered in ascending 
order of installation years and descending tariffs (zoomed vertical axis) 
For wind offshore plants, two step tariffs show a very simple trend. The peaks indicating 
higher tariffs correspond to plants carrying EEG-keys for higher starting tariff with reduced 
number of initial years as mentioned in 2.1.5. 
 
Figure 2.9 Wind-Offshore plant tariffs (right) and installed capacities (left) ordered in ascending 
order of installation years and descending tariffs 
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Two step tariffs for wind onshore plants also show a relatively simple pattern. Peaks visible in 
starting and end tariffs from years 2001 to 2008 are owing to plants with EEG-keys 
corresponding to system services bonus mentioned in 2.1.4. Three tariff divisions can be 
observed in start tariff curve after 2009 attributable to repowering, normal plants and plants 
with system services bonus. However, no such divisions can be observed in end tariff due to 
end of such provisions as per EEG-2009. Yearly digression in tariffs can be observed while a 
step increase in starting tariff curve in year 2009, brought by EEG-2009 is also visible.   
 
Figure 2.10 Wind-Onshore plant tariffs (right) and installed capacities (left) ordered in 
ascending order of installation years and descending tariffs 
 
2.2.2 Estimating revenues of RE plant owners CEEG 
After the determination of default average tariff for individual RE plants stated above, a 
python program is developed that implements the model described by equation (5). 
Methodology regarding estimation of elements of each vector is described below: 
Non-direct marketing tariff (?̅?𝑷−𝑵𝑴): This vector, in general, gets the values of default 
average tariffs displayed in previous section. However, slight modifications are done for plants 
coming after year 2014. The default average tariffs are reduced in line with provisions of 
EEG-2009 mentioned in 2.1.6. These include fixed amount reduction in tariffs for plants 
falling under category of small plants and 20% reduction for remaining plants. Applicable 
tariff for wind plants is selected as either start or end tariff based on plant’s installation date 
and starting tariff period. 
During the process of validation of final calculations of above stated model with data available 
for year 2015 as per (BMWi, 2016b), it was observed that the default average tariffs, described 
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in section 2.2.1, were highly under estimated for biomass, wind onshore and offshore plants as 
shown in top section of Figure 2.11. For biomass, investigations showed that the average 
default tariffs, for plants with no EEG-keys but falling under similar installation periods with 
plants with EEG-keys, were significantly low. The obvious reason was the absence of EEG-
keys which led respective plants to get basic tariffs with no bonuses. For biomass, significant 
bonuses remained applicable from year 2001 to 2012. To get rid of the underestimation in 
results, an equalization methodology was applied where by the difference of mean of 
informative plants (with EEG keys) and non-informative plants (without EEG-keys) was 
added to later mentioned plants. 
For wind onshore plants, major cause of under estimation occurred because of the assumption 
that all wind plants would get an equal start tariff period of 5 years. As per EEG provisions 
mentioned in 2.1.2, the wind onshore plants get initial tariff periods based on their yield 
comparison with a reference plant yield. Onshore plants can get an initial tariff period from 
16.25 years to 5 years based on land’s wind resource quality from 60% to 150% respectively. 
However, no such data was available in the (Energymap, 2017). Therefore, a simply approach 
was adopted. Percentage shares of wind onshore plants installed between 2009 and 2011 
against land portions with different wind resource quality were taken from (Agora, 2014). 
Assuming same shares for all years, a weighted average extension of initial tariff periods was 
determined that came out as 9 years. 
For wind offshore plants, major cause of underestimation was due to many plants missing the 
EEG-keys for increased start tariff model. The clue was derived from the fact that average 
tariff paid to offshore plants in 2015 as per (BMWi, 2016b) was 18.4 cents/kWh which 
indicated that most of the offshore plants must have chosen the increased start tariff provision. 
To get rid of underestimation, therefore, all offshore plants above 3.6MW were allocated 
increased start tariff model based on their biggest share in whole offshore plant data base 
(Energymap, 2017).                
Direct marketing tariff ?̅?𝑷−𝑴: This vector is created by adding management premiums of 
eligible plants into vector ?̅?𝑃−𝑁𝑀 in line with provisions of EEG-2012 mentioned in 2.1.5. 
Management premiums are applicable to plants constructed from 2012 to 2014 as per EEG-
2012. Management premiums for wind and solar plants are set at 0.4 cents/kWh while rest of 
the plants get 0.2 cents/kWh from 2015 onwards as per §100 of EEG-2014.  
Market Factor 𝑴𝑭̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑷−𝑵𝑴: Although direct marketing affects non-significantly on overall 
costs for EEG eligible plants installed till 2015, the provision of reduced fixed remunerations 
for non-direct marketed electricity as per EEG-2014 will impact the overall costs arising from 
future power plants. Therefore, marketing factor is incorporated in the python model and is 
available for scenario creation. For the scope of this study, average direct marketing factors for 
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each technology have been taken from data of 2015 as per (BNetzA, 2016b) and are assumed 
to remain same till 2035. These are listed in Table 2.1. During the process of validation of cost 
results from the model with reference cost data of 2015 as per (BNetzA, 2016b), significant 
divergences of costs, linked with direct or in-direct marketing, were observed. The obvious 
reason was the use of same average marketing factor from smallest to biggest plant capacity. It 
was earlier shown in section 2.2.1, the default tariffs generally decrease slightly with 
increasing capacities. Since, larger plants are often direct marketed more than smaller plants, 
as also visible in the depiction provided by (Götz, et al., 2013), the above stated approach led 
to overestimation of direct marketing costs and underestimation of non-direct marketed energy 
costs as shown in middle section of Figure 2.11. To get rid of the said error, a simple strategy 
was adopted. Capacity threshold was defined for each technology based on interpretations 
conceived from (Götz, et al., 2013) and divergence from reference cost data. All plants with 
capacities above the threshold (cleavage point), get marketing factor higher than average level 
while the lower capacities get lower marketing factor such that overall average marketing 
factor remains unaltered. Deviation factor from average marketing level is determined based 
on condition that any plant’s marketing factor must not rise above 1 or become negative. 
Deviation factor therefore, depend on total capacity of plants included in 𝐶𝑎𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 and are 
listed in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1 Average marketing factor and cleavage point per technology to distribute higher and 
lower marketing factors among higher and lower capacity plants [Source: Self, (BNetzA, 2016b)] 
Technology Average Marketing Factor 
(%) 
Cleavage Point 
(% of ∑ 𝑪𝒂𝒑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝒊𝒋𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓) 
Wind Onshore 90.5 Not applied 
Wind Offshore 99.7 Not applied 
Solar 18.6 26.0 
Biomass 72.5 33.3 
Gas 62.6 Not applied 
Geothermal 39.8 85.0 
Hydro 53.9 33.3 
       
Other Additions: Two additional revenue components are added to calculated CEEG as per 
equation (5). One corresponds to payments eligible to self-consumption of building based solar 
power plants constructed from 2009 to 2012 as per provisions of EEG-2009 mentioned in 
2.1.4. Using solar self-consumption and related costs of 2017, predicted by (TSOs, 2016a), 
average remuneration for self-consumption is determined. A self-consumption factor of 0.3 is 
multiplied with total plant generation (excluding self-consumption) to determine the yearly 
self-consumption of the eligible power plants. The self-consumption factor is set in such a way 
that the model calculated self-consumption revenue of 2017 match with the revenues predicted 
by (TSOs, 2016a). The other revenue component corresponds to flexibility premiums given to 
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biomass plants mentioned in 2.1.5. The amount of flexibility premiums is set at the level as of 
2015 and is assumed to remain constant for future years based on its flat trends in recent past 
years (BMWi, 2016b). 
 
Figure 2.11 Percentage variation of model calculations for EEG revenues of plant owners with 
respect to reference revenues of 2015 from (BNetzA, 2016b): Without corrections (Top), With 
non-market related corrections (Middle), With all corrections (Bottom) 
 
2.2.3 Scenario for EEG plants development 
A python program is developed that extends the plant based data base (Energymap, 2017) 
using five yearly scenarios of installed capacities per technology per German province for 
years 2020, 2025, 2030 and 2035. For the scope of this study, a 2035B scenario for installed 
capacities per province has been taken from (NEP2030, 2017). Remaining five yearly 
scenarios are developed based on linear plotting of installed capacities from status quo 
capacities of 2015 till 2035. Sub-provincial (NUTS3) resolution is utilized in planning the 
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future installations. For each period of 5 years, the declining volume of status quo capacities 
are compared with target capacities of scenario year on provincial level. If the future scenario 
demands installation of capacities in a province with no prior installed capacity, the demanded 
capacity is set in terms of plants put in all NUTS3 regions of the province in equal shares at 
randomly selected months throughout the five-year period. In case of existence of prior 
installed capacities, the scenario demanded capacity is translated to NUTS3 regions using 
share factors as of 2015 as existed in status quo plant data base. The sub-provincial capacity 
levels of declining status quo plants are then compared with scenario demanded sub-provincial 
capacities. NUTS3 regions with positive difference are set with new plants as per prior said 
procedure. NUTS3 region with negative difference are ignored. During calculation of capacity 
differences, the accumulated new capacities as per previous scenario years is also deducted 
from future scenario demands. Figure 2.12 give the model scenario results. Yearly total 
capacities per technology are listed in Appendix Table A.1.     
 
Figure 2.12 Model Scenario: Start year EEG capacities from 2015 to 2035 
Estimating the future developments of average default tariffs for EEG technologies is tedious 
task that requires extensive research around several aspects such as learning curve effects, 
technical improvements, social acceptance etc. Under limited time constraint, this thesis 
addresses the future tariff developments in a simpler way. The average default tariff for 2015, 
2025 and 2035 are taken from assumptions adopted by (Oeko-Institut, 2016). The tariffs for all 
other years are simply determined by linear plotting. Figure 2.13 shows the future yearly 
tariffs as per described methodology. These are also listed in Appendix Table A.2. 
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Figure 2.13 Model Scenario: Future development of average default tariffs for each EEG 
technology [Source: (Oeko-Institut, 2016)] 
   
2.2.4 Scenario of EEG generation 
For the scope of the study, the hourly capacity factors for the EEG eligible technologies are 
assumed same as of 2015, through data obtained from Wuppertal Institute. Figure 2.14 shows 
the yearly development of EEG generation from 2015 to 2035. EEG generation would rise 
from 168TWh in 2015 to 268TWh in 2035. In 2035, the proportional shares of biomass, solar, 
wind onshore and wind offshore energy productions will be 12, 25, 34 and 24% respectively. 
Yearly total EEG generations per technology are listed in Appendix Table A.3. 
 
Figure 2.14 Model Scenario: Yearly generation from EEG eligible plants from 2015 to 2035 
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2.3 Model Results and Validation 
Figure 2.15 shows the model results for yearly CEEG plotted against the reference figures for 
2015-2017 obtained from (BMWi, 2016b). The model results align well with the reference 
data. The total costs increase roughly 24% from 2015 to 2024 after which the costs decrease 
sharply due to expiring high cost power plants. In 2035, CEEG stands 99% of 2015 value.  
 
Figure 2.15 Model Results: Yearly CEEG for years 2015-2035 and reference predictions for 2015-
2017 from (BMWi, 2016b) 
Figure 2.16 shows the model results for the base EEG surcharge for unprivileged consumers 
plotted against the reference figures from (Oeko-Institut, 2016). The reference study modelled 
the yearly EEG surcharges using average EEG tariffs for status quo EEG plant capacities. The 
EEG generation scenario chosen by the reference study is also comparable to the model 
scenario. The future EEG prices per technology for year 2015, 2025 and 2035 used in the 
model scenario have also been taken from the reference study. It can be observed that the 
model results align well with the trend predicted by the reference study. The observable 
variations can be attributed to average tariff approach adopted by the reference study for status 
quo plants in early years and a different plant deployment strategy adopted by the reference 
study in later years. Since, the tabulated information about yearly capacity deployments, 
energy generation and costs are not available with the reference study, no quantitative 
comparisons could be presented. Yearly model results for the EEG surcharge are listed in 
Appendix Table A.4. 
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Figure 2.16 Model Results: Yearly base EEG surcharge for unprivileged consumers for years 
2015-2035 vs results of same prediction from (Oeko-Institut, 2016) 
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3 NETWORK CHARGES 
3.1 Perspective 
Germany has a regulated transmission and distribution system of electricity. The transmission 
and distribution sector was formally unbundled, through revision of Energy Industry Act 
(EnWG) in 1998 following EU regulations, however, the regulation of legal unbundling came 
later in 2005 (Brandt, 2006). The author states that before 2005, the grid companies worked on 
negotiated access system in agreement with producer and consumer associations. After 
liberalization, regulated access came into force. As per new system, federal regulator 
‘Bundesnetzagentur-BNetzA’ is responsible to regulate TSOs and those DSOs that have a 
customer base above 100,000 or that operate in multiple regions. The remaining distribution 
network operators are regulated by state regulators ‘Landesregulierungsbehörde-LRegB’. 
German Ordinance on Grid Fees for Electricity or Stromnetzentgeltverordnung (StromNEV) is 
the main regulatory tool for calculation of overall network charges. Network charges are 
recovered based on rates per peak demand (KW) and energy consumption (kWh) from 
consumers. Demand and consumption rates are determined for individual network operator 
using load coincidence factor methodology. For non-interval metered customers, a standard 
load profile is assumed while interval metered consumers get individually determined time 
based demand and energy rates. Starting from 2009, the total collectable revenues (costs) for 
transmission and distribution business are determined on basis of incentive regulation or 
Anreizregulierungsverordnung (ARegV). ARegV applies a system of regulations which is 
close to theoretical framework of price cap regulation in dynamic setting (Joskow, 2006).  
(BNetzA, 2017) gives a simplified explanation of cost regulation procedure. ARegV has 
applied two regulatory periods; 2009-2013 and 2014-2018. For each regulatory period, yearly 
revenue cap for individual grid operator is determined in a dynamic setting using a base level. 
Base level is determined for whole regulatory period through a cost assessment, one year 
before start of new regulatory period. It is based on financial data of the grid operator for the 
preceding year (called as basis year). The dynamic setting of yearly revenue cap using the 
such ex-ante determined base level is governed through a pricing formula as under: 
 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝑪𝒂𝒑 = 𝑪𝟏 + (𝑪𝟐 + (𝟏 − 𝑽)×𝑪𝟑)×(𝑰 − 𝑷𝑭)×𝑬𝑭 + 𝑸 + 𝑽𝑪 + 𝑷𝑨 (7) 
Where:  
 C1= Non-influence-able costs  PF= General Productivity Factor 
 C2= Efficient Costs    EF= Expansion Factor 
C3= Non-efficient Costs   Q = Quality Bonus/Penalty 
I   = Inflation adjustment   VC = Volatile Costs 
V =Allocation Factor     PA= Previous Adjustments 
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Yearly revenue cap is determined at the start of a regulatory period. The base level is first 
determined using past financial performance of the network operators as described earlier. It 
contains several cost components that are either influenceable or not influenceable by the grid 
operator. The cost efficiency benchmarking studies are also executed at the start of each 
regulatory period. Benchmarking studies use methods like Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
or Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and make indices for each grid company. For TSOs, 
benchmarking is done considering transmission utilities on European level. For DSOs, 
benchmarking is done among each other. However, not all DSOs are benchmarked. Smaller 
DSOs can use a simplified process whereby a single general benchmark can be used for all. 
This general benchmark is the weighted average of national efficiency benchmarks for all 
DSOs participating in the benchmarking process. To have a fair benchmarking, several 
structural factors are considered such as number of metering points, network length, supply 
area and RE connection rate etc. Individual cost efficiency factors, thus determined, are 
applied to the operator’s base level influenceable cost components. It thus results into 
noncontrollable (efficient) part ‘C2’ and controllable (non-efficient) part ‘C3’. The regulatory 
formula (7) is so designed that the non-efficient costs are gradually excluded from the yearly 
revenue caps using an allocation factor ‘V’. V is set as 0.2 which serves for the efficiency 
improvement incentive. The influenceable costs are also subject to inflation and general 
productivity changes during regulatory period using parameters ‘I’ and ‘PF’. PF accounts the 
general efficiency improvements in transmission or distribution business. Expansion factor 
‘EG’ enables a DSO, facing change in its structural parameters, to revise revenue cap for rest 
of the regulatory period. In recent years, it mainly occurred due to increasing RE deployments 
and is realized in regulatory formula by estimating expansion factor based on increase in 
number of feed in points of distributed generations. (BNetzA, 2016a) states that this parameter 
is incorporated to realize the increased costs of lasting changes in grid network as soon as 
possible. A quality factor ‘Q’ has been introduced in the regulatory formula in the second 
round and gives reward or penalizes the grid operators based on the status of their service 
quality. Service quality factor is mainly determined through recording the System Average 
Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) for the grid operators.  Previous adjustment factor ‘PA’ is 
added to the revenue cap formula which compensates the differences of the yearly fixed caps 
and generated revenues of the previous regulatory period. This factor provides the volume risk 
coverage owing to yearly sale volume changes. The total amount is applied uniformly across 
the years of the next regulatory period. As per ARegV, the regulatory formula (7) will be 
slightly changed in the third regulatory period. The main change would be the introduction of 
supper efficiency factor that would reward the superefficient grid operators. 
Non-influence able costs ‘C1’ contain several components and is indicated explicitly by §11 
of ARegV. Table 3.1 lists down the general cost categories against grid nature and nature of 
control. Subsequent sections explain these cost categories individually. 
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Table 3.1 Cost categories considered for regulated yearly revenues of grid operators  
Cost Component Network Nature Cost Nature 
Approved capital costs(Transmission Expansion etc.) 
Transmission 
Non-influenceable 
System services costs 
Compensations paid to municipalities1 
Working capital costs for EEG Sales 
Avoided network charges 
Distribution 
Costs of retrofitting necessary for system frequency 
Regular capital costs 
Transmission/Distribution Influenceable 
Operation and Maintenance Costs2 
1- Compesations paid by TSOs to muncipalities for laying new transmission lines  
2- Costs incurred on mainiting operational staff, planning, management, servicing equipment etc 
3.1.1 Capital costs 
Capital costs originate from the past and future investments by the grid operators, necessary 
for expansion and strengthening of grid. Considering needs for grid expansion to cope with the 
RE generation, a comprehensive mechanism is in place that requires the TSOs to carry out 
certain pre-determined transmission projects. Cost arising from such investments are 
considered as non-influenceable for the grid operator and grid operator recovers all such costs 
through generated revenue. Cost arising from other regular investments are subject to 
operator’s cost efficiency and expansion factors as indicated by formula (7). As per ARegV 
prescribed mechanism, capital costs consist of two components explained below: 
Return on capital: It covers the return expected by the grid operator on its investment 
(Equity) and the interest payable to lenders (Debt). Weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
is calculated by assuming equity share at maximum of 40% and rest as of debt. Actual interest 
status on debt is accounted while return on equity is fixed for each regulatory period. For 
present regulatory period, return on equity is the sum of risk free rate of 3.80% and risk 
premium of 3.59% (BNetzA, 2017). Including the corporation tax of 1.66%, the imputed rate 
of return on equity comes out to be 9.05%. For calculation of asset base, investments older 
than 2006 are assessed on current costs and new investments are assessed on historic costs. 
Depreciation: For long-term satisfactory operation of grid assets, a straight-line yearly 
depreciation is allowed to grid operators. It is at the grid operator’s discretion to either re-
invest or distribute it as dividend (BNetzA, 2017). Individual investments vary in life time 
depending on the asset nature. Individual depreciation life times for different asset categories 
are indicated in StromNEV. It generally lies around 35-50 years (IE Leipzig, 2012). 
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3.1.2 Working capital for EEG sales 
As per EEG framework, TSOs are responsible for selling the energy produced from EEG 
generators and distribute the generate revenues among the grid operators as per stipulated 
procedures. The revenue comes from fixed EEG surcharge and sale of RE electricity in 
wholesale markets. This whole operation needs a considerable liquid capital in advance. To 
compensate for the use of this capital from own resources by the transmission grid operators, 
return on capital is separately allowed to be recovered from generated revenues and is 
considered in setting revenue cap.   
3.1.3 System services costs 
Transmission grid operators provide several services in order to operate the grid securely and 
reliably. The costs incurred for each of these services are separately recorded and passed onto 
consumers as part of network charges. Functional descriptions of these system services and 
arising costs are briefly explained below: 
Reserve costs: Reserve power is often needed to keep the load and generation balance of 
power system at all time. In Germany, balance responsible parties (BRP) provide time based 
schedules for binding generation and load commitments. These commitments can be revised 
on hourly basis. TSOs monitor the execution of these commitments and if in real time, balance 
disturbance occurs from BRPs, reserve power is actuated to keep the balance. After such 
events, proper cost accounting is executed and costs of reserve energy utilized during the 
event is distributed over the BRPs that deviated the schedules. To keep this reserve energy 
intact for use in such events, power capacities are contracted in advance through tendering. 
The capacity charges paid to reserve plants by TSOs are recovered through network charges as 
one part of system services. The types of capacities contracted are mainly differentiated based 
on action time and generally named as primary, secondary and tertiary(minute) reserves. 
Reserve power capacities can be categorized as positive and negative. Positive reserves 
generate reserve energy while negative reserves absorb excess energy at the time of high 
generation. Primary reserves (PC+/-) are automatically actuated with fastest response time and 
are shared among cross border TSOs across Europe. Secondary (SC+/-) and Tertiary (TC+/-) 
reserves are jointly contracted by all four TSOs with in Germany (Hirth & Ziegenhagen, 
2013).   
Redispatch and RE Curtailment costs: To avoid grid bottlenecks such as congestion, TSOs 
are required to take necessary actions. A major part of these actions are the modifications of 
the generation commitments received from market operator or feed in from RE plants. When a 
conventional power plant is asked to reduce its generation, appropriate compensations for 
variable costs are paid by the TSOs to these power plants. At the same time, some other power 
plants are required to increase generation and are paid accordingly. Costs arising in such 
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activities are accounted as Redispatch costs. RE power plants, supported by EEG, generally 
enjoy a preferred feed but in some unavoidable circumstances, feed in from such plants is 
reduced along with backup energy from other non-EEG power plants. RE plants are 
compensated for their due remunerations as per EEG and accounted as RE curtailment or 
Einspeisemanagement (Einsman) costs. In recent times, grid delays caused the redispatch and 
Einsman costs to rise to significant amounts. 
Strategic Reserve costs: In recent years, increasing RE deployment has reduced the profit 
margins for conventional power plants (gas and coal based) and many of such plants have 
announced departure from generating business (Hinz, et al., 2014). However, these highly 
flexible power plants are essential for stable and secure system operations. From 27th June 
2013, a newly introduced regulation of reserve power plants or Reservekraftwerksverordnung 
(ResKV) allows the TSOs to buy these plant capacities as strategic reserves to be used for the 
purposed of redispatch. The costs arising in these operations are separately accounted as 
strategic reserve costs. 
Reactive power compensation costs: Reactive power is essential for maintaining a stable 
voltage profile across the power system. For such purposes, special devices (capacitive and 
inductive) are deployed throughout the network. Reactive power capable power plants are also 
committed (Hinz, et al., 2014). Costs to this category are included in network charges. 
Energy losses: Compensation of network losses, is the responsibility of network operators. 
Network operators compensate these losses by buying this energy through long term contracts. 
The costs related to such commitments are recovered through network charges.    
3.1.4 Avoided network charges 
Avoided network charges are an important revenue component of all generation power plants 
that connect with downstream grids. Its concept is that the decentralized generators are small 
and expensive then large power plants. However, they are closer to load and avoid power 
transmission costs. In commercial markets, such expensive plants cannot compete with 
cheaper centralized power plants. To clear market externality, decentralized power plants are 
given a fee per generated kWh that correspond to equivalent cost of transporting that kWh 
over the upstream networks. In this way, such plants restructure their financial streams and 
able to compete in market (BNetzA, 2016a). Ideally, these payments are done through savings 
achieved by DSOs due to reduction of their peak demand which is considered while charging 
grid tariffs to DSOs by TSOs. However, practically these payments have been exceeding 
beyond the DSO yearly savings due to weaknesses in tariff system (Bayer, 2015). The avoided 
grid charges are not distributed among EEG and KWK power plants. Instead, these avoided 
grid charges are paid to TSOs. It is because such plants are paid cost covering fixed 
remunerations either in form of feed in tariffs or market premiums.   
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3.1.5 Costs for retrofitting necessary to system frequency stability 
In Germany, distributed generation grew steadily since 2000. With time, grid code evolved to 
ensure network stability. However, due to the time lag in adopting ever evolving necessary 
changes into grid codes, significant portion of distributed generation was installed that would 
disconnect at any grid frequency out of the range of 49.5-50.2Hz. (Ecofys, 2014) estimated 
such capacity as around 48GW. A simultaneous disconnection of such huge capacity can risk 
a blackout of whole European grid system as the shared primary reserves are not sufficient to 
handle it. The reason led to development of a special ordinance on Ensuring the Technical 
Safety and System Stability or Systemstabilitätsverordnung (SysStabV). As per the ordinance, 
grid operators are responsible for carrying out the necessary retrofitting of applicable power 
plants to comply to new frequency stability requirements. Retrofitting costs are generally very 
small, in order of few hundred euros per plant (Ecofys, 2014). Plant operators are reimbursed 
75% of the costs. Grid operators can reclaim 50% of such costs through network charges.      
3.1.6 Reduced grid charges 
§19 StromNEV allows applying reduced network charges for consumers whose style of 
consumption helps decreasing overall network costs. Consumers whose peak load occurs on 
times significantly different from system load, can get individual network charge that should 
be at least 20% of regular network charge. Consumers whose consumption lies above 10GWh 
and full load hours above 7000 can also get individual network charge at least above 20%, 
15% and 10% for full load hours equal to 7000, 7500 and 8000 respectively. Individual 
network charges are approved by the regulator for whole regulatory period subject to review 
upon insufficient eligibility in future.  
3.1.7 Historical development of network costs 
Network costs have showed a rising trend in past years, primarily in distribution sector. Figure 
3.1 shows the yearly transmission and distribution costs. Figure 3.2 shows the historical trend 
of important cost drivers for the overall network costs. It can be observed that the avoided 
network costs have been consistently increasing due to increasing deployment of decentralized 
generators. Redispatch and Einsman costs have sharply increased after 2013 due to grid 
bottlenecks arising of increasing RE generation. On the other hand, reserve costs are 
decreasing despite the increasing variable RE plants. 
As already mentioned, network charges are decided at the grid company level. Therefore, they 
are diversified across Germany. Status of grid charges as of 2017 for three consumer classes is 
displayed in Figure 3.3. It can be observed that the northern Germany faces high grid charges 
owing to high capital costs due to undepreciated investments of last two decades, relatively 
higher grid expansion costs and lower population density etc. (Hinz, et al., 2015; Bayer, 2015).   
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Figure 3.1 Yearly transmission and distribution costs 2009-2016 [Source: (Behringer, 2016)] 
 
Figure 3.2 Important cost drivers 2011-2015[ Source: BNetzA, (Hirth & Ziegenhagen, 2013)] 
 
Figure 3.3 Regional network charges for household (left), medium business (middle) and 
industrial (right) consumers as of 01.01.2017 [Source: BNetzA] 
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3.1.8 StromNEV-19 surcharge 
As mentioned in 3.1.6, some consumer categories get a reduced network charge. Such cases 
normally result in loss of part of revenue to cover all network costs of network operators. To 
cover these losses, network operator can pass them to downstream grid operators and 
ultimately to final consumers in form of a special surcharge. Regarding application of this 
surcharge, three types of consumption categories have been established: 
Category-C: Consumption above 1GWh of manufacturing or rail industry whose electricity 
consumption costs for previous year are above 4% of their sales. 
Category-B: Consumption above 1GWh for consumers who do not lie in category C. 
Category-A: Consumption below 1GWh for all consumers 
§19 StromNEV also provides the maximum limit of the surcharge to be 0.05 and 0.025 
cents/kWh for consumer type B and C respectively. Figure 3.4 gives the surcharge levels for 
three categories over recent years. It can be observed that category B and C get regulation 
limited surcharge levels. The lost revenue is thus recovered from category A, which results in 
higher surcharge level for those consumers. 
3.1.9 Offshore liability surcharge 
As per fundamental regulation of all EEG Acts, transmission operators are responsible to 
provide grid connection to offshore wind installations and maintain it. However, it is more 
challenging to connect offshore wind power plants then other RE plants especially when the 
plants are situated far from the coast. Furthermore, for German grid, the offshore wind power 
installations are concentrated within territories of two transmission operators. In response to 
financial concerns of these transmission operators regarding connection of offshore wind 
power plants, a special fund was allowed as per §17f EnWG, starting from 2013, above the 
regulated revenue cap allowed for covering network costs. The fund covers the liabilities of 
respective transmission operators arising due to delayed completion of grid interconnections 
or connection service failures related with offshore wind installations. The fund is recovered 
through offshore liability surcharge or offshore haftungsumlage (OHU), using same 
methodology as mentioned for StromNEV-19 surcharge in section 3.1.8. Figure 3.4 gives the 
surcharge levels for three categories over recent years. For years 2016-17, the OHU surcharge 
level was not high enough to regulate category-B surcharge level. Furthermore, the positive 
balances from past years resulted in negative surcharge values for category A consumers.       
3.1.10 Interruptible load surcharge 
Since the incorporation of Disconnect-able Loads Regulation or Abschaltbare Lasten 
Verordnung (AbLaV) in 2012, demand side management is promoted on the high voltage 
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level. As per regulation, the industrial loads, which are connected to grid system at above 
110KV level and can reliably reduce consumption if requested by the transmission operators, 
can get special remunerations in this regard. The eligible parties are pre-qualified by the 
transmission operators and participate in weekly tendering. TSOs provide volume 
requirements for dis-connectable loads subject to review and adjustment by BNetzA based on 
periodic demand analysis for each TSO. Successful parties get remunerations as per demand 
and energy rate. Costs arising in this respect are equalized through a special interruptible load 
or AbLaV surcharge. The surcharge is applied across the consumer classes without any 
privileges. Figure 3.4 gives the AbLaV levels for past years which remained as low as 0.006 
cents/kWh. There was no such surcharge in 2016 due to regulator transitional period.         
 
Figure 3.4 Surcharge levels for category A, B, C for years 2013-17 [Source: Netztransparenz.de] 
3.2 Model Description 
As it is already mentioned that network charges are different for different DSO consumers. 
Under the scope and time constraints of this thesis, geographical variations are not modelled, 
instead the costs, mentioned in section 3.1, are estimated on whole country level. Network 
charges are applied on consumers based on the voltage level that they connect with in the grid 
system. Costs associated with any upstream voltage network is passed on to directly connected 
consumers based on their share of energy consumption. Electricity fed to downstream 
networks is also treated same i.e. upstream network operators charge downstream operators in 
similar manner as directly connected industry regarding calculation of grid charges. The 
similar mechanism of payments continues in downstream networks till the end user is reached. 
For modeling, two segregations are assumed for the whole grid system in Germany as 
described in (Hinz, et al., 2014). First segregation features high (usually 110KV) and medium 
(usually 35KV) voltage networks which generally fall under DSOs. Although a small portion 
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of industry is also connected with TSO networks, but in this study, it is assumed that all 
industrial loads connect at high/medium voltage (MHV) network because of limited past cost 
data availability. Second segregation features low voltage (usually 0.4KV) networks which 
connect all household and small to medium enterprises. Equations (8) and (9) present a 
simplified relation of average network charges with total network costs (NC), for a target year 
and for above described consumer categories, based on the two segregations power grid.  
 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 =
𝑁𝐶×𝑓𝑀𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑁𝐶×𝑓𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝐶𝑜𝑛×𝑓𝑀𝐻𝑉−𝑇𝑊ℎ
 (8) 
 𝑵𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌 𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆𝑯𝑯/𝑺𝑴𝑬 =
𝑵𝑪×(𝟏 − 𝒇𝑴𝑯𝑽𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕)
𝑪𝒐𝒏×(𝟏 − 𝒇𝑴𝑯𝑽−𝑻𝑾𝒉)
 (9) 
 𝑵𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌 𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒐𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒗_𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚 =
𝑵𝑪×𝒇𝑴𝑯𝑽𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕
𝑪𝒐𝒏×𝒇𝑴𝑯𝑽−𝑻𝑾𝒉
 (10) 
           Where: 
 fMHVcost= Factor to determine amount of NC occurred on MHV network level. It is estimated by 
  (Hinz, et al., 2015) as 28.4% in 2014. This study assumes it constant for all years. In python model, it is 
 is linked with yearly consumption at MHV level through simple proportionality factor of 
𝐶𝑜𝑛×𝑓𝑀𝐻𝑉 𝑇𝑊ℎ
𝐶𝑜𝑛
. 
 fexemptions= Factor to determine amount of NC not paid as privilege. It is estimated as 5.4% based on 
 ratio of total costs recovered through StromNEV-19 surcharge and network costs of 2016 taken from 
 (Behringer, 2016). The former costs are estimated using StromNEV-19 rates of 2016 and  consumption 
 amounts of category A, B, C as per (TSOs, 2016b). This study assumes fexemptions constant for all years. 
 fMHV-TWh=Factor to determine amount of TWh consumed at MHV network level. (Hinz, et al., 2015) 
 estimates it as 57% of total consumption in 2014. This study assumes it constant for all years. 
 Con= Consumption in target year (assumed same for all years as of 2015) 
It can be seen in equation (8), that for calculating average network charges for all industry, the 
MHV network costs are first reduced by the exempted volume of costs not paid by privileged 
industry. Equation (10), however, includes no such reduction and indicates the average 
network charges that are applied to non-privileged industries. The provisions of StromNEV 
are so designed that smaller consumers such as household or small to medium enterprises do 
not qualify for any exemptions. Therefore, no such exemptions are considered in equation (9).  
The costs not paid by the privileged industry, coming from equation (8) are recovered through 
additional surcharge as per §19 of StromNEV. The model calculates the surcharge for 
categories A, B and C as per simple procedure mentioned in section 3.1.8. OHU and AbLaV 
surcharges are also calculated in similar fashion, however, the relevant total costs for these 
categories are directly given by the user. For the scope of this study, the total costs for these 
categories are fixed to levels as of 2017 available from prognoses provided by TSOs, 
accessible through (netztransperenz, 2017). 
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Network costs (NC) are calculated as per simple self-explanatory equation (11). Costs for 
energy losses TDlosscosts are estimated using a simple cost rate RL-cost and losses factor fL-TWh. 
RL-cost and fL-TWh are estimated as 10.75 Mio Euros/TWh and 5.2%, at levels as of 2015, taken 
from (BNetzA, 2016a) and are assumed constant in this study. Methodology adopted to 
calculate rest of cost components in equation (11) is explained in subsequent sections. 
 𝑁𝐶 = 𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝐷𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝑇𝐷𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 (11) 
3.2.1 Transmission Costs (Tcosts) 
Transmission costs comprise of capital costs CT-capital, operating costs CT-op and services costs 
(will be discussed separately). Compensation payments mentioned in Table 3.1 are not 
considered in modeling owing to their small share and high unpredictability. Capital costs 
arise from yearly depreciations DT of invested assets and total return RT on investments for 
network expansion IT-new, investment for network replacements IT-rep necessary for long term 
stable operations and monthly working capital IT-WC needed for managing EEG sales. Returns 
of IT-WC and IT-rep are determined from assumed investments of 115 and 180 Mio. Euros for all 
years using 2015 estimates provided by (Hinz, et al., 2014) respectively, however, model 
provides flexibility to change these values on yearly basis for different user scenarios. For 
return on investment calculations, WACC of 6.59% is used based on methodology mentioned 
in section 3.1.1. For debt, interest rate of 4% is used (Hinz, et al., 2014).   
To calculate yearly grid expansion investments IT-new, a simple strategy is chosen. A linear line 
is plotted using two data points on a graph between needed investment It (independent-axis) vs 
the achievable increase in RE share fRE (dependent-axis). First data point is taken from (Dena-
Netzstudie II, 2010). From the study, the total investments needed till 2020 are determined by 
aggregating yearly investment estimates against three alternatives on average basis. It comes 
out, thus, as 11.8 Bio. Euros against the target of 39% RE share in gross energy consumption 
(gross production minus exports). This investment estimate is based on the year 2010. Yearly 
investments for expansion of transmission network done from 2011 to 2015 are therefore 
subtracted from the estimate to get an approximate estimate at the end of 2015 using data 
available in (BNetzA, 2016a). To get fRE, the RE share in gross consumption in 2015 i.e. 
31.7% is subtracted from 39%. Second data point is taken from first draft of network 
development plan submitted by TSOs on 31st January 2017 (NEP2030, 2017). NEP2030 gives 
the total planed investment of 35 Bio. Euros against target RE share of 52% (average of given 
range) till 2030 under scenario-2030B. The investment estimate also includes 6 Bio. Euros 
cost of start Netz. Since, the estimates are given with 2017 as base year, investments done in 
2016 are included to set the reference year to 2015 in common with previous data point. The 
developed graph can be further loaded with more data points in future to increase accuracy. 
The mathematical function so created, is then used to determine yearly investments for 
transmission network for any given target RE share in gross consumption. Figure 3.7 shows 
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the cumulative transmission investments against target RE share in gross consumption derived 
for above stated methodology. 
For any target year starting from 2016, rate of return R and depreciation D is determined by 
methodology presented in (Hinz, et al., 2014) through equations (12) and (13) respectively.  
 𝑅 =  𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡
(1 + 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)𝑇×𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶
(1 + 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)𝑇 − 1
+ 𝐼𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚2016×𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 (12) 
 𝑫 =
𝑰𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟔
𝑻
 (13) 
      Where: 
 Ihist (2015) =P2015 
 𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) −
𝑃2015
𝑇
 
 𝐼𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚2016(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 𝐼𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚2016(𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) − 𝐷(previous year) 
 Ihist= Undepreciated portion of accumulated historical investments before 2016 
 Ifrom2016= Accumulated investments starting from 2016 excluding yearly depreciations 
 P2015= Value of undepreciated grid infrastructure at the end of 2015 
 T = Average period of network infrastructure depreciation 
Transmission specific undepreciated portfolio value PT-2015 is estimated by first determining 
PT-2012 as per methodology described by (Hinz, et al., 2014) whereby the per km rate of 
transmission line/cable and per MW rate of voltage transformation system of 2013 are 
multiplied to respective assets owned by TSOs in 2012 and aggregated. It is corrected with last 
20 years of inflation and multiplied with average portfolio depreciation factor. (Hinz, et al., 
2014) provides the estimates for average portfolio depreciation factors for all TSOs, whose 
average comes out as 35% and is used in this model. This method determines infrastructure 
value as historical costs rather than replacement costs. For extending the results to 2015, an 
approximate approach is adopted where by the investments of 2012-2015 are added to PT-2012 
and fixed rate depreciations are excluded using average end of life period of grid infrastructure 
as 40 years. Return on historical investments, 1st term of (12), is an implementation of annuity 
method. Direct method, as used with investments from 2016 onwards, is not used here due to 
non-availability of data regarding age structure of historical investments (Hinz, et al., 2014).    
 
Transmission operating costs CT-op are calculated by summing indirect or overhead costs and 
costs of O&M for the transmission assets. Overhead costs are considered as 868 Mio. 
Euros/GWh as stated by (Hinz, et al., 2014). Costs of O&M are linked with grid assets in 
operation which are assumed under this study as the undepreciated investments. (Hinz, et al., 
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2014) gives an average O&M costs factor of 3.1% per undepreciated investments, which is 
also considered here to calculate increase of O&M costs above 2015 base level.  
3.2.2 Distribution Costs (Dcosts) 
As described in sections 3.1.4 and 3.1.5, apart from general capital costs CD-capital, overhead 
and O&M costs CD-op, costs for distribution operators also include payments of avoided grid 
charges to distributed generators and costs occurring due to retrofitting of renewable energy 
plants. However, it does not include costs of most of grid services such as reserves or 
redispatch, which fall under TSO scope.  Like transmission grid, the capital costs for 
distribution grid arise from yearly depreciations DD of invested assets and total return RD on 
investments for network expansion/strengthening ID-new mainly driven by increasing 
decentralized RE power plants and investment for network replacements ID-rep necessary for 
long term stable operations. Yearly depreciations and returns on historical investments and 
investments starting from year 2016 are calculated in same fashion as described by equations 
(12) and (13) in section 3.2.1. As an exception, the parameter PD-2015 is extended from PD-2014 
as per prior described procedure. PD-2014, however, could not be determined from assets, asset 
rates and inflation rates due to lack of data and complexity owing to huge number of DSOs 
operating in Germany. Instead, back calculation of equations (12) and (13) is done from the 
estimated capital costs of 2014 as 3.1 Bio and average depreciation of 37% on historical 
assets, provided by (Hinz, et al., 2015).     
To calculate yearly distribution grid investments ID-new, similar strategy is chosen as described 
in section 3.2.1. Two data points are taken from (Dena-Verteilnetzstudie, 2012). First data 
point belonged to leading scenario (Leitszenario) which was based on scenario B of NEP2012. 
As per scenario, 27.5 Bio. Euros are needed from 2010 to 2030 to reach RE share of 62% in 
total installed capacity. Second data point belonged to federal state scenario which was based 
on scenario C of NEP 2012. As per scenario, 42.5 Bio. Euros were needed from 2010 to 2030 
to reach RE share of 82% in total installed capacity. RE share in gross consumption as per first 
data point can be assumed as 50% since scenario B in NEP studies generally target official 
targets set by German government. For second data point, 82% of share of RE in installed 
capacity is a very ambitious target. Since, RE share in gross consumption depends on most 
economical consumption methodology, it is very complex to estimate such share based on 
mere knowledge of RE share in installed capacity. For this study, to avoid complexity and 
delays, most ambitious target of RE share of 58% in gross consumption is chosen for second 
data point. It is chosen from the most ambitious scenario out of all scenario results collected 
under study (BDEW, 2010). Figure 3.7 shows the cumulative distribution investments against 
target RE share in gross consumption derived for above stated methodology. 
To calculate distribution costs, apart from capital costs CD-noncap, a simple strategy is adopted. 
The cost level is estimated for year 2015 around 10 Bio. Euros from assumption taken from 
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(Hinz, et al., 2014) which considered around 80% of all distribution grid revenues associated 
with non-capital costs. The resulting cost level is subtracted by costs of avoided grid charges 
paid by DSOs in 2015 as per (BNetzA, 2016a). From 2016 onwards, cost level so calculated is 
added with two cost heads to make yearly CD-noncap. First is the yearly avoided grid charges Cav 
set at the level of 2015 in scope of present study. Second is the new O&M costs arising from 
new investments determined by considering factor of 3.1% as stated earlier in section 3.2.1. 
Costs incurred to maintain system stability as described in section 3.1.5 are not considered in 
model since they are of temporary nature and have a nonsignificant share in CD-noncap. 
3.2.3 Services Costs 
Costs for reactive power services are addressed by simply fixing the amount as of 2015, 
however, the yearly value can be adjusted as per user needs. Costs of remaining services are 
modelled as follows:  
Reserves costs:  (Hirth & Ziegenhagen, 2013) states that as per several Europe based studies, 
primary reserve (PC+/-) capacities do not depend on increase in RE installations. However, 
increased RE installations does impact the amount to be contracted for secondary and tertiary 
capacities CapST+/-. The author acknowledges that although, from historical data, it can be 
observed that total reserve requirements have gone down while RE installation share was 
increasing, it can be attributed to increasing accuracies in forecasting and better handling of 
TSOs in managing control areas in cooperation with each other. Nevertheless, through 
convolution based assessment of historical data, the author comes up to the results that the 
reserve requirements would increase in the range of 1.5 to 6.5% per GW increase in wind and 
solar installations against the 60% to none improvement in variable RE forecasting techniques 
respectively. Considering the past decreasing trend in reserve costs, the lowest increase factor 
is considered for modeling under present study. Costs for primary reserves are assumed to 
remain same as of 2015, however, the yearly primary capacity is available as input to user to 
adjust as per scenario needs. Costs per MW for secondary and tertiary reserves are estimated 
as average of positive and negative control capacity costs provided by (BNetzA, 2016a). 
Yearly CapST+- is determined by using above stated factor and the EEG capacity development 
scenario explained in section 2.2.3.        
Redispatch & Einsman: The need of redispatch and Einsman arises because of grid 
limitations. In recent years, these measures are rising mainly due to rising renewable energy 
penetration into the grid. As per (BNetzA, 2016a), around 92% of all Einsman measures were 
taken on wind and solar based energy generators.  Therefore, the costs arising from these 
measures can be related to grid infrastructure investments and renewable energy generation. In 
python model, yearly grid investments drive the volume of redispatch and Einsman measures 
in TWh. The methodology is explained below. 
Network Charges  Model Description 
 
51 
 
A redispatch and Einsman index (RdEnindex) is defined as the ratio of cumulative TWh of 
redispatch and Einsman (RdEncum) to yearly EEG generation. Two reference yearly RdEnindex 
curves are created using yearly EEG generation scenario from section 2.2.4 and three data 
points listed in Table 3.2 . One curve is for no grid delay case (RdEn̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅nodelay) i.e. the case when 
yearly grid investments 𝐼?̅?𝑒𝑓 are done as would be needed to reach goal of attaining 50% of RE 
share in gross consumption in 2030 as per scenario 2030B from (NEP2030, 2017). This results 
in a yearly investment of 3,547 Mio. Euros (T+D). Underlying assumption is that the grid 
development measures are designed to limit the RdEncum at 2010 level. In this curve, the 
RdEnindex linearly decreases from 2016 level to 2010 level from year 2016 to 2023 and 
afterwards retains the level till 2035. The second curve is for the case of a ten-year delayed 
grid development RdEn̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅delay using study (Agora, 2013). The study analyzed the effects of grid 
delays on overall system costs. It stated that in 2023, the redispatch and Einsman measures 
would be around 10.2 TWh along with EEG production around 254TWh as per scenario B of 
NEP2013, excluding the assumed 20TWh of non-EEG production (BNetzA, 2016a). This is 
when: 
1. The grid development (also called Start Netz) required as per 2013 amended Electricity 
Grid Expansion Act or Energieleitungsausbaugesetz (EnLAG) complete up till 2023. 
 
2. The grid development measures defined by the then 2013 version of Grid Expansion 
Law or Bundesbedarfsplangesetz (BBPlG), that were due till 2022, would be delayed 
ten years 
Considering above study and data point 3 in Table 3.2, RdEn̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅delay was designed in such a way 
that the RdEnindex would decrease linearly from 2016 level to 2023 level for the years 2016-
2023 and then decrease to 2010 level until 2033 (after ten years) and stay same onwards. 
Under such scenario, however, the grid investments must be enough to cover Start Netz costs, 
which are roughly 6 Bio. Euros as per (NEP2030, 2017). The RdEn̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅nodelay and RdEn̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅delay 
curves are shown in Figure 3.5. 
Table 3.2 Model Parameters: Reference data points for 𝐑𝐝𝐄𝐧̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐧𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐲 and 𝐑𝐝𝐄𝐧̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐝𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐲 curves 
Year EEG Generation 
(TWh) 
RdEncum 
(TWh) 
RdEnindex 
(%) 
Source 
2010 82.3 0.433 0.52 (BNetzA,2011) 
2016 172 8.92 5.2* (BNetzA,2015), (BDEW, 2017) 
2023 254 10.2 4.0 (Agora, 2013), (NEP2013) 
* For calculating 2016 level of RdEnindex, redispatch TWh for 2016 were taken from (BDEW, 2017) 
while Einsman TWh were considered at level as of 2014 from respective BNetz’s monitoring report of 
2015 due to non-availability of 2016 data. Value for 2015 was not considered as it was very high due to 
a grid bottleneck which got cleared in 2016 (BNetzA, 2016a). 
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Figure 3.5 Model Parameter: 𝐑𝐝𝐄𝐧̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐧𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐲 and 𝐑𝐝𝐄𝐧̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐝𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐲 curves 
Once the RdEn̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅nodelay and RdEn̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅delay curves are defined, the input RdEncum for any year ‘y’ is 
determined by following equation: 
 𝑹𝒅𝑬𝒏𝒄𝒖𝒎(𝒚) =  [𝐑𝐝𝐄𝐧̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐧𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐲(𝒚) + 𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒚𝒇𝒄𝒕𝒓×(𝐑𝐝𝐄𝐧̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐝𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐲(𝒚) − 𝐑𝐝𝐄𝐧̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐧𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐲(𝒚))]×𝑬𝑬𝑮 𝑮𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏(y) (14) 
Where the delayfctr ranges from 0 to 1 for delay in grid investments from 0 to 10 years. The 
delay in grid investments is determined by subtracting cumulative scenario investment of the 
year ‘y’ from cumulative 𝐼?̅?𝑒𝑓 and dividing it by 3,547 which is the reference yearly 
investment for grid development without delay described before. Figure 3.6 shows the upper 
and lower RdEncum curves for corresponding 10-year delay and no delay cases.   
 
Figure 3.6 Model Scenario: Yearly RdEncum as per two curves 𝐑𝐝𝐄𝐧̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐝𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐲 and 𝐑𝐝𝐄𝐧̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐧𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐲 
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3.2.4 Scenario for grid investments 
It is already mentioned in section 2.2.3 that the future EEG plant development has been 
assumed in line with scenario-2035B of (NEP2030, 2017). As per the said scenario, the RE 
share in gross consumption is targeted at average 57% or an increase of 25.3% from status quo 
31.7% RE share in 2015. Therefore, the yearly grid investments are determined as per 
methodology presented in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 by setting RE target of 57%. Yearly 
investment, thus, come out as 4,393 Mio. Euros (T+D).  Figure 3.7 shows that the cumulative 
transmission and distribution investments for period 2015-2035 comes out around 56.4 and 
31.4 Bio. Euros respectively. The figure also shows the trend of cumulative investments 
needed against any targeted RE share increase. The trends show steeper increase as we target 
higher increase of RE share in gross consumption.   
 
Figure 3.7 Model Scenario: RE target share in gross consumption by 2035 and required 
cumulative investments in Transmission and Distribution grid 
3.3  Model Results and Validation 
Figure 3.8 shows the model results for yearly transmission costs segregated into respective 
components. A validation has been done for the model results with the prediction done by 
(Hinz, et al., 2015) for 2024 transmission costs. The reference study assumed around 24.6 Bio. 
Euros of cumulative transmission expansion investments in period 2015-2024 which is 
comparable to this model’s assumed cumulative transmission investment of 25.3 Bio. Euros 
for the same period. Model results indicate the transmission costs of 2024 as 6.3 Bio. Euros 
against the reference study’s 6.4 Bio. Euros.       
Figure 3.9 shows the model results for yearly distribution costs segregated into capital and 
non-capital parts. A validation has been done for the model results with the prediction done by 
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(Hinz, et al., 2014) for 2023 distribution costs. The reference study assumed approximately 
13.8 Bio. Euros of cumulative distribution expansion investments in period 2015-2023 which 
is comparable to this model’s assumed cumulative distribution investment of 12.5 Bio. Euros 
for the same period. Model results indicate the distribution costs of 2023 as 17.6 Bio. Euros 
against the reference study’s 18.2 Bio. Euros. 
 
Figure 3.8 Model Results: Yearly transmission costs vs 2024 transmission costs predicted by 
(Hinz, et al., 2015)  
 
 
Figure 3.9 Model Results: Yearly distribution costs vs 2023 distribution costs predicted by (Hinz, 
et al., 2014) 
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Figure 3.10 shows the model results for average yearly network charges for household/SME 
and unprivileged industry consumers. It is observable that there is a consistent increase in 
charge levels from the year 2016 onwards. The network charges are slightly decreased from 
2015 to 2016 due to low assumption taken about redispatch and Einsman costs. It can be 
observed that network charges increase steeply for household/SME consumers as compared to 
industrial consumers.   
 
Figure 3.10 Model Results: Yearly average network charges for household/SME and industrial 
(unprivileged) consumers  
Appendix Table B.1 lists the yearly transmission, distribution and services costs while 
Appendix Table B.2 presents the yearly average network charges for household/SME, 
unprivileged industrial consumers and StromNEV-19 surcharges against categories A, B and 
C. For OHU and AbLaV surcharges, as mentioned earlier in section 3.2, the associated total 
costs are assumed constant, at level as of 2017, for the future years under this study scope. 
OHU surcharge for categories A, B and C, thus, remains at levels of 0.058, 0.049 and 0.025 
Cents/kWh respectively. AbLaV surcharge remains at level of 0.007 Cents/kWh.    
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4 KWKG SURCHARGE 
4.1 Perspective 
In Germany, since 1st April-2002 after coming into force of Combined Heat and Power Law or 
Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung Gesetz (KWKG), KWK plants are supported through an independent 
mechanism closely similar to EEG support system. Eligible KWK plants are generally offered 
an optional guaranteed selling tariff based on past quarter’s average whole sale electricity 
price along with fixed bonuses per unit of electricity generated in KWK mode. Some 
payments are also directed to heat networks and storage providers. To find the specific portion 
of electricity generated in KWK mode, a KWK rating factor is determined for each plant 
through testing, that when multiplied to total heat produced gives the total KWK-electricity 
eligible for support. For smaller installations with no heat meters, all produced electricity is 
considered as KWK-electricity. Total costs of KWK support are recovered from consumers 
through a special surcharge known as KWKG surcharge. Like EEG surcharge, certain 
consumers are eligible to exemptions which is recovered by higher surcharge for unprivileged. 
KWKG-2002 was very limited in its application and complexity. The support plan was offered 
only for certain specific years and for plant categories differentiated as old, recent old or 
modernized existing plants, new small plants below 2MW and fuel cell based plants. EEG 
supported KWK plants were not given any support under this framework. Self-consumption or 
use within private network e.g. within a building apartments was not eligible for support. The 
support was given in fixed cents per kWh of eligible portion of production and yearly total 
support was capped at 750Mio Euros. 
KWKG was amended further in 2009 which led to inclusion of following important support 
scheme changes: 
1. Support of existing and new high efficiency KWK plants below 50KW or fuel cell 
based plants were set to highest and was available for ten years. 
2. For new KWK plants, high efficiency requirement was set in place along with support 
either for period of 6 years or till 30,000 full load hours. Modernized high efficiency 
plants were considered as new. Support was differentiated in capacity ranges like EEG.  
3. Self-consumption was allowed a full support as the grid fed electricity. 
Amendment of KWKG in 2012 brought a further change whereby along with modernized 
plants, retrofitted power plants above 2MW were eligible for support. Support period 
depended on costs related with such modernizations/retrofitting and was between 30,000 and 
10,000 full load hours or as other option, if applicable, either 10 or 5 years. 
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Latest amendment of KWKG in 2016 brought along some fundamental changes and eligibility 
conditions. Main additions are: 
1. Coal based KWK plants are no more supported and transition from coal to other fuel 
sources is encouraged through bonus over basic support. Bonus is also given to support 
emission obligations of new power plants. 
2. Yearly support cap was doubled and eligible full load hours for below 50MW KWK 
plants was raised from 30,000 to 60,000 hours along with a general increase in support 
prices in context to lowering wholesale prices which affected revenues of KWK plants 
owing to their usual market price based agreements (Gailfuss, 2016). At the same time, 
eligibility for support of self-consumption was limited to either small plants below 
100KW or plants feeding energy intensive enterprises. 
3. Micro KWK plants can either get per kWh support or a onetime payment at start. 
4. Unlike previous KWKG versions, KWKG-2016 set a future goal in absolute terms i.e. 
110 and 120TWh KWK based electricity by 2020 and 2025 respectively.  
5. A reduced KWKG surcharge for railway industry of maximum either 0.03 or 0.04 
cents/kWh was previsioned. KWK-surcharge will also be reduced for industries in 
general in accordance to mechanism put in §64 of EEG (mentioned in 2.1.8) except 
that it must not be below 0.03 cents/kWh. 
4.2 Model Description 
As already mentioned, that there are several exemptions and reductions allowed to KWKG 
surcharge based on consumer category and nature. The developed model determines the base 
KWKG surcharge for unprivileged consumers for a target year by following formula: 
 
 𝐾𝑊𝐾𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 =
𝐶𝐾𝑊𝐾×𝑓𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑛×𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑣
 (15) 
      Where: 
 CKWK = Total KWKG costs for target year 
 Con= Consumption in target year (assumed same for all years as of 2015)  
 fcost= Factor to determine amount of CKWK left after excluding revenues from privileged consumers  
 funprv=Factor to determine amount of Con left after excluding privileged consumption 
 (fcost and funprv are determined as 0.978 and 0.540 using 2017 prognose (TSOs, 2016c) while Con is set 
 to 488TWh as of 2015. All parameters are assumed non-variable for calculations of future years)  
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Removing cost and consumptions factors from equation (15) and using 80% or 85 % 
reductions, KWK surcharge for 20% and 15% categories of privileged industries (mentioned 
in 2.1.8) can be determined respectively. CKWK for a target year is a sum of three main 
elements provisioned in KWKG-2016: 
  
 𝐶𝐾𝑊𝐾 = 𝐶𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑡/𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  (16) 
      Where: 
 Csupport = Costs owing to payment in cents/kWh to KWK generation 
 Conetimepayment= Costs owing to onetime payment option for less than 2KW KWK plants 
 Cnet/storage= Costs owing to payments to heat networks and heat storage systems 
 
Two cost components, Conetimepayment and Cnet/storage, made less than 10% of total KWKG costs 
in recent several years. They are assumed at the levels as of 2016 as per (TSOs, 2016c). Csupport 
is calculated through detailed modeling. Csupport is the total costs accounted for paying support 
in cents/kWh to eligible KWK plants for KWK-generation as per terms and conditions of 
KWKG applicable in the period when the plant got commissioned. To estimate these costs, it 
is therefore essential to handle separately the different KWKG regimes of 2009, 2012 and 
2016. Based on limited data availability and relative size of KWKG surcharge component in 
overall electricity costs, a simple approach is adopted whereby Csupport is estimated for the 
target year by following formula: 
 
 𝐶𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 = ∑ (𝐶𝑎𝑝2009×𝑃2009 + 𝐶𝑎𝑝2012×𝑃2012 + 𝐶𝑎𝑝2016×𝑃2016)×𝐶𝐹
𝐶1,𝐶2,𝐶3,𝑀
 (17) 
       Where: 
 M, C1, C2, C3= plant categories explained below 
 Cap= Cumulative capacity per category till target year falling under KWKG-2009/2012/2016 
 CF= Capacity factor per category 
 P= Average per unit support payments per category falling under KWKG-2009/2012/2016   
For calculating Cap2009,2012,2016, a data set is taken from (Öko-Institut, 2015), shown in 
Appendix Table C.1, which contained the yearly additional capacities in MWs that came 
under the KWKG support from 2009 till 2014. The data set is modified into four categories. 
Three categories are for new, replaced or retrofitted KWK plants based on capacity sizes i.e. 
C3 for less than 50KW, C2 for 50-2000KW and C1 for above 2MW. Category-M is for 
modernized plant capacities falling in all size ranges. From the dataset, expiring capacities and 
corresponding years are determined based on incoming capacity timelines and an average 
support period estimate per category. Cap2009,2012,2016 is determined by summing the yearly 
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incoming and expiring capacities per year and later accumulating it over the years. KWKG 
support expires for the plants that complete their respective support periods allowed in KWKG 
framework. Average support periods are determined in number of years from the study of 
respective KWKG frameworks and are listed in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Model Parameters: Average support periods (years) for KWK plant categories 
Framework Cat-M* Cat-C1** Cat-C2 Cat-C3 
KWKG2009 6 6 6 10 
KWKG2012 8 11 10 10 
KWKG2016 8 11 10 20 
 * Roughly 75% of yearly modernizations belonged to above 50% cost category (Öko-Institut, 2015). The 
 50% cost category, as per KWKG, get double support period length then below 50% cost category. The 
 average support  period is determined by weighting support periods of each KWKG accordingly. 
 **In various cases where support period length is not given in years but in total supportable full load 
 hours in  respective KWKG regimes, average yearly full load hours for C1-plants are used, determined 
 by averaging industrial and general supply’s yearly average full load hours weighted by their share in 
 overall KWK generation in 2014 using data available in (Öko-Institut, 2015).    
To extend the above-mentioned data set of incoming capacity additions from 2014 onwards 
till 2035, a brief context is to be considered. (Gailfuss, 2016) said that although the KWKG-
2016 increased the support amount per kWh, which reached up to 83% in maximum cases, it 
was done in context of falling whole sale prices. Furthermore, the self-consumption will now 
be treated with reduced support. Therefore, it can be implied that the trends of yearly capacity 
additions under KWKG framework will continue without significant change. Furthermore, 
KWKG-2016 set a target of reaching 120TWh in 2025 while in 2014, 98TWh were produced 
from KWK capacity (Öko-Institut, 2015). This gives a roughly 22.4% growth margin in 
generation, which if applied in same extent on capacity, the growth margin would come out to 
be around 7GW, assuming total KWK capacity in 2014 as 32GW (Öko-Institut, 2015). 
Therefore, it can be implied that KWKG law will facilitate the growth in KWK installations to 
meet at least 7GW of additions and maintain it. It must also be noted that the KWK generation 
remained nearly stagnant around 97 to 100TWh from 2010 to 2014 (Öko-Institut, 2015). In 
addition, an important aspect is that if the yearly support cap of 1.5 bio euros is crossed, then 
necessary support reductions would be applied to limit the support levels. In the stated context, 
the yearly capacity additions for future years are assumed to continue as per previous 
increasing trends until the total supported capacity under KWKG framework (Cap2009/2012/2016 
collectively) reach around 7GW while the Csupport remains under limit of yearly support cap. 
Onwards the new additions are so designed that the total supported capacity should remain 
locked around 7GW, assuming that the capacities, whose KWKG support expires, compensate 
fully the general KWK capacities expiring operationally. This means that outside KWKG 
supported new plant portfolio, the KWK capacities remain at the same level as of 2014. 
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Figure 4.1shows the input scenario of category wise yearly accumulated capacities (regardless 
of individual KWKG frameworks) along with the actual new capacities obtained by summing 
categories C1, C2 and C3. It can be observed that installed capacity under all categories, 
except M, become stagnant after 2018 upon reaching the newly supported total capacity of 
7000MW. Installed capacities under category M saturates after 2020 as the further increase 
would cause CKWK to cross yearly cap. 
 
Figure 4.1 Model Scenario: Yearly accumulated capacities for categories M, C1, C2, C3 and new 
KWK capacity obtained from summing C1, C2 and C3 results. 
The parameters P and CF, used in equation (17), are plant dependent. However, due to 
absence of plant based dataset, average values are estimated. CF is determined from 
accumulated installed KWKG capacity as described earlier and KWKG eligible generation 
taken from ‘Jahresabrechnung’ report of year 2014 (TSOs, 2015) and is listed in Table 4.2. 
Figure 4.2 shows the actual variations of capacity factor over the period of 2013-2015.  It can 
be observed that setting the capacity factors at the values observed in 2015 is roughly justified 
since the variation over the past two years are not very significant. The parameter set P which 
feature the average payments in cents/kWh to KWK plants per category and per KWKG 
regime is also determined using ‘Jahresabrechnung’ reports and is shown in Table 4.2. For 
KWKG-2009 & 2012, Jahresabrechnung reports of 2011 (TSOs, 2012) and 2014 (TSOs, 
2015) are used respectively. These years are chosen in such a manner that tail effects of 
KWKG 2002 regime in 2009 & 2010 and transition effects of KWKG2009 and KWKG2012 
in year 2012 can be avoided. Years 2013 and 2014 are also skipped since year 2015 provides 
the latest figures. For calculating average P values per category for KWKG2012 using year 
2015, total yearly payments are first subtracted with payments owing to plants falling under 
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KWKG2009. The flexibility of choosing a specific year is justified since unlike EEG 
framework, remuneration rates do not change under KWKG frameworks. P values for 
KWKG2016 are not possible to estimate in same fashion since no data is yet available. They 
are set at 50% increase from past values based on a broad approximation of results obtained by 
comparing support sets of C1, C2 and C3 classes for KWKG 2016 & 2012 using plant 
capacities in range of 1KW-50MW.        
Table 4.2 Model Parameters: P(cents/kWh) and CF for KWK plants 
Parameter Cat-M Cat-C1 Cat-C2 Cat-C3 
P2009 1.68 1.59 2.45 5.11 
P2012 2.20 2.28 3.46 5.41 
P2016 3.3 3.42 5.19 8.11 
CF 0.36 0.29 0.4 0.51 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Variation of KWK capacity factors over 2013-2015 
4.3 Model Results and Validation 
Figure 4.3 shows the results of the model calculation of yearly KWK support costs occurring 
per plant category. The model calculations follow in general the trends seen in past years. The 
costs prediction of 2017 provided by (TSOs, 2016c) aligns well with the model results. Figure 
4.4 gives the future trend of base KWKG surcharge for unprivileged consumers as per 
KWKG-2016 mechanism, mentioned by equation (15). Appendix Table C.2, provides the 
aggregate yearly installed capacities, generation, costs and KWKG surcharge values as 
resulted from model calculations.      
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Figure 4.3 Model Results: Yearly KWK support costs plotted along with known support costs as 
per Jahresabrechnungen reports of 2009-2015 and 2017 prognose (TSOs, 2016c). 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Model Results: Yearly base KWK surcharge for unprivileged consumers as per 
KWKG-2016 mechanism 
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5 PRICE DEVELOPMENT TILL 2035 
Results from the prior described python models are segregated as per applicable regulations, 
across three consumption classes defined in next sections along with model results. In the 
yearly results, the components; billing/metering & operation fees, concession fees, electricity 
duty and supply costs are assumed to remain at same level as of 2015, shown in Table 1.2. The 
results are presented excluding VAT component. 
5.1 Household Consumption 
Households are connected to the grid at low voltage (0.4KV). Households are metered on non-
interval basis using standard load profile and are not considered for any exemptions in 
network charges as discussed in 3.1.6. Households generally consume less than 10,000kWh 
which makes them in-eligible to any reductions in surcharges or electricity duty. Figure 5.1 
shows the model results for the yearly average electricity price development of household 
customers. The results show that household would face an increase of roughly 3.37 
Cents/kWh in electricity prices till 2028 mainly due to rising EEG surcharge and network 
charges. After 2028, the falling EEG surcharge levels would provide some relief but the prices 
would still be higher than 2015 due to consistently increasing network charges. 
 
Figure 5.1 Yearly average electricity price development for household customers from model 
calculations (Values for 2013,2014 from BNetzA)  
5.2 Unprivileged Industrial Consumption 
An unprivileged industry would be the one which is not linked to rail system and which is 
connected to high or medium voltage grid system (110KV or 35KV). The yearly consumption 
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for such industry would generally lie above 24GWh as per (BNetzA, 2016a), however, as per 
category scope only the costs of the first GWh consumption are considered. Therefore, no 
reductions in EEG, KWKG, StromNEV-19 and OHU Surcharges are applicable. Owing to 
connection to high voltage network, such industry enjoys significantly reduced network 
charges and concession fees. However, it is assumed that the industry does not qualify for any 
reductions in network charges owing to its asymmetric load profile. Due to high consumption 
volumes, the billing/metering costs and supply costs are also relatively less for industries. 
Figure 5.2 shows the yearly price development for this consumption category. The results 
show an increase of roughly 2.17 Cents/kWh in electricity prices till 2024.  
 
Figure 5.2 Yearly average electricity price development for unprivileged industrial consumption 
from model calculations (Values for 2013,2014 from BNetzA)         
5.3 Privileged Industrial Consumption 
For privileged consumption class, an industrial load similar to one described in previous 
section can be considered with assumption that industry’s electricity cost intensity, described 
in section 2.1.8, is at least 20% and consumption class considered is above 1GWh so that it is 
eligible for 85% reduction in EEG and KWKG surcharge as per §64-EEG-2017 and qualify 
for category C rate in regard to application of StromNEV-19 and OHU surcharge. It is also 
assumed that the industry has asymmetric load with full load hours above 8000 hours so that it 
gets only 10% of regular network charges. It is further assumed that the said consumption 
class relates to those manufacturing processes which are exempt from electricity duty. This 
legal provision is in place to safeguard international competitiveness of German industry. 
Figure 5.3 shows the yearly price development for said consumption category. The results 
show that said consumption class would face a minute increase of roughly 0.24 cents/kWh in 
electricity prices till 2024. 
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Figure 5.3 Yearly average electricity price development for privileged industrial consumption 
from model calculations (Values for 2013,2014 from BNetzA) 
Figure 5.4 depicts the five-yearly electricity retail price development across three consumption 
classes discussed above. It can be observed that the relative increase of component prices, 
resulted from model predications, is highest for the household consumers and there is hardly 
any such effect observable for privileged industrial consumption.  
 
Figure 5.4 Five yearly electricity price development for three consumption classes; Households 
(Left), unprivileged industry (middle) and privileged industry (right) 
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6 CONCLUSION & OUTLOOK 
Two important aspects are clearly visible from model results. Firstly, the EEG energy 
generation will rise significantly till 2035, which would make roughly 60% increase from 
status quo level of 2015. Secondly, the retail electricity prices are still expected to rise owing 
to increasing EEG surcharge and network charges. The integration of fast growing renewable 
energy generation and rising retail prices within Germany, are already the subjects of intense 
discussion on diverse social, political, economic and academic forums. The next two sub 
sections give a brief outlook on these subjects in light of several consulted literatures. The last 
subsection presents the existing model research gaps and outlook of the future research 
possibilities to enhance the developed python models.    
6.1 Integration of RE generation 
Fast RE growth has already revolutionized the German electricity industry. RE growth has 
made whole sale electricity prices to fall considerably not only within Germany but also in 
neighboring countries. It has noticeably contributed towards reducing country’s dependency 
on imported fuels. Vast spread decentralized solar generation has brought a strong prosumer 
culture at the end user side of the electricity supply chain. The efforts for smart grids and 
digitalization make more sense now and are happening with clear directions. The variable RE 
generators are participating in reserve markets using spatial diversity benefits, thus, 
unshackling the core limitation of variability of individual RE installations through 
cooperation. On the other hand, RE growth has brought grid development challenges to cope 
with redispatch and Einsman costs. Electricity markets are facing critical challenge to 
maintain long term supply security nationally and on European level. 
Integration of RE generation is not a solo pursuit of Germany. It’s a collective European 
ambition as well. (Agora, 2015) states that 70% of EU’s new electricity installations of 2013 
were RE based. The author illustrated Germany’s standings in the 2020-RE targets across EU 
member states, shown in Figure 6.1. The figure shows clearly that Germany’s RE ambition 
aligns well into EU context. In such environments, the author states that the close cooperation 
of cross border electric grids can improve the supply security in concern to rising RE 
generation. As per new methods developed by Pentalateral Energy Forum for joint assessment 
of resource adequacy, the author states that joint peak load of EU neighbors comes out 10GW 
lesser than the sum of individual country load peaks. However, this close cooperation has yet 
to meet many challenges.   
(Stefes & Hagor, 2016) states that the need for grid development in Germany had already been 
identified by German Energy Agency (Dena) in 2005. However, the political, financial and 
administrative limitations delayed the process. In the meantime, cross border EU 
Conclusion & Outlook  Integration of RE generation 
 
67 
 
interconnections helped meeting the north based high generation and south based high 
consumption of Germany. In recent years, grid congestion from German north to south has 
caused electricity produced from RE installations of north, to take indirect paths, also called 
loop flows, through east European countries like Poland, Czech, Slovakia and Hungary 
(Schlandt, 2015).  The loop flows compromised the N-1 grid security criteria of the affected 
countries. Complains from these countries led to the installation of physical power controlling 
devices at some grid points which made it even more important to pursue grid development to 
cope with expected high growth of RE in north, especially offshore wind.          
 
Figure 6.1 EU 2020-RE targets [Taken from (Agora, 2015)] 
Rapidly increasing RE generation is also a matter of concern as present electricity markets 
provide insufficient price signals and incentives to encourage flexible but expensive peak 
power plants and baseload generators, that lack flexibility to tune to cheap variable RE feed in, 
to stay in operation. For future, Germany is favoring for a market only approach supported by 
strategic reserves, however, other European countries favor capacity markets as evident from 
the recent Winter Package from EU Commission. If Germany, would take a solo path, it may 
end up with disadvantages on national and EU level as investigated by (Statnett, 2015). The 
author states that such a path would lead Germany to depend more on electricity imports at the 
time of low RE generation. This would also lead neighboring countries to focus strongly on 
capacity security due to lack of any investment signals from Germany.   
By far, Germany has been very successful in bringing the positive effects of Energiewende in 
electricity sector. However, with the expanded RE portfolio, the need for sector coupling has 
become much more important. Electric vehicles, electricity storage, demand side management, 
power to heat etc. are the options that must be promoted to cope with future periods of peak or 
no RE generation when the backup would be either insufficient or too expensive to afford.  
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6.2 Rising retail electricity prices 
Rising retail electricity prices have already been a big concern for Germany despite the 
benefits of RE energy sales at the wholesale market level. Apart from the rising EEG costs, 
regional problems with network charges are also present. Consumers of DSOs that are facing 
high decentralized RE growth, are paying for increased costs owing to avoided network 
charges that relieve, in turn, the EEG surcharge levels for all country. Region based network 
charges are rising for less dense German north due to grid expansions for offshore RE 
installations and general reinforcements to cope with decentralized RE generation.    
Rising EEG surcharge levels have already changed the course of EEG when in 2012, the solar 
cap was introduced which was later extended to wind and biomass as well. In context to 
developing EU context and to promote cost efficiency, auction system was also introduced in 
EEG-2017. However, the EEG mechanism has not remained simple anymore and there is a 
strong counter pulling argument. Controlling the cost efficiency may contradict with the 
fundamental Energiewende dimension of diversified ownership. (Stefes & Hagor, 2016) 
suggests that the introduction of auction system may reverse the trend of decentralized RE 
plant ownerships back to big investors as they can easily outcompete the former in energy 
costs. It was due to such concerns, EEG-2017 provisioned no auctions for below 750 KW 
solar and wind plants and below 150KW biomass plants. 
Exemptions allowed in EEG mechanism is also a great social debate in Germany. (Agora, 
2015) states that although the household electricity retail prices in Germany are relatively 
high, the average household consumption is quiet small which ends up in same energy 
expenses as the households of comparable industrialized countries. However, (Stefes & Hagor, 
2016) states that Energiewende is socially unbalanced, which distributes income from bottom 
to middle and top class. The author argues that industries enjoy EEG exemptions and the 
lower wholesale electricity prices due to Energiewende. The home owners and farmers pay 
higher electricity bills but they also benefit from own RE generation. Those who live in 
apartments face the high electricity costs but counter some effects through efficient use of 
electricity. However, the lowest income class may not even utilize the efficiency measures due 
to insufficient savings to invest. (Ecofys, 2015) states that energy intense German industries, 
that receive full privileges on surcharges/electricity duty and reduced grid fees, get 
competitive electricity rates. Without such privileges, the German households and small 
businesses may enjoy slightly reduced EEG surcharges (around 1.6 cents as of 2014). 
However, lack of privileges would have negative macroeconomic effects along with around 
104,000 lost jobs, estimated by the authors.   
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6.3 Research gaps and future research direction 
During the development of the models for EEG, KWKG, StromNEV-19 surcharges and 
network charges, some key research gaps were either deliberately simplified or could not be 
modelled due to time constraints. The brief description of these research gaps is listed below: 
1. All Models: A constant yearly consumption has been assumed for future years. Yearly 
consumption depends on several factors such as economic conditions, efficiency 
incentives, demographic changes etc. A research can be conducted to develop a more 
realistic consumption scenario. Furthermore, the factors used in equations (1), (8), (9), 
(10) and (15) depend on yearly consumption trends between privileged and 
unprivileged consumers. At present these factors are simply assumed based on forecast 
results from (TSOs, 2016a), (Hinz, et al., 2015) and (TSOs, 2016c). In future, the 
model can be enhanced to model privileged and unprivileged consumptions and cost 
distributions. 
2. EEG Model: Future development of EEG average tariffs was estimated using (Oeko-
Institut, 2016) with simple linear interpolation. In practice, these tariffs depend on 
several aspects such as learning curve effects, technical improvements, social 
acceptance etc. A research can be conducted to develop a more realistic future tariff 
scenario by incorporating above stated aspects. 
3. EEG Model: To get rid of underestimation of costs for wind onshore plants owing to 
assumption of the same minimum initial tariff period of 5 years, an average increase of 
9 years was added to all onshore plants, based on weighted average initial tariff periods 
of country wide wind plants on lands with varying wind resource potentials, as 
described in 2.2.2. This approach is an oversimplification of EEG costs for the wind 
onshore plants. In future, model can be enhanced in such a fashion that the wind 
onshore plants available in the plant database (Energymap, 2017) can be given 
individual initial tariff periods based on their geographical parameters i.e. Nuts3 or 
Merra2 ids.  
4. EEG Model: At present a single cleavage strategy is assumed for distributing market 
factors among smaller and bigger plants. In future, model can be enhanced to feature 
three or more plant groupings with distinct direct marketing habits as evident from 
illustrations provided by (Götz, et al., 2013).  
5. Network Charges Model: The relation between needed grid investments and targeted 
RE shares was estimated using two data points each of distribution and transmission 
sectors. Although, the original target was to collect at least four data points for each 
sector to achieve higher accuracy of predictions, author’s limited ability with literature 
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research in German language, hindered the progress and confined the research to two 
points each only. In future, this aspect can be enhanced relatively easily by further 
research of additional data points. 
6. Network Charges Model: The model does not incorporate the detailed modeling of 
avoided network charges. The sharp rise of costs incurred by DSOs in respect of 
avoided network charges, in recent past, has already sparked huge debate in academic 
researches. In future, the model can be enhanced to incorporate modeling of costs of 
avoided network charges. It will enable the model users to conduct researches on better 
policy options for handling such costs. 
7. KWKG Model: The support rates per kWh for KWK generation as per KWKG-2016 
was assumed as 150% of KWKG-2012 rates based on a broad approximation of results 
obtained by comparing support sets of C1, C2 and C3 classes for KWKG 2016 & 2012 
using plant capacities in range of 1KW-50MW. This approximation was adopted due 
to absence of data i.e. the Jahresabrechnung report-2016 for KWKG yearly accounts 
has not been yet published. Upon the availability of the said and additional data, the 
average support rates can be appropriately researched and incorporated.       
As already shortly discussed in the subsection 6.2 that the rising retail electricity prices are 
sparking strong social concerns in Germany. Model results for EEG surcharge and network 
charges predict further increase in prices in future which are significant enough to be 
considered. Consequently, these results drive the motivation for a possible research into 
analyzing effects of opting innovative policy options that would dampen the increasing prices 
partially. However, such researches can only be realistically conducted if further models are 
integrated with the developed model. These further models may include the modeling of future 
developments of wholesale electricity prices, yearly supply margins, yearly consumption, 
feedback effects of electricity prices on consumption behaviors etc.          
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Appendix A. Data relating to EEG Model 
 
Appendix Table A.1 Model Scenario: Yearly EEG capacity (GWs) per technology 
Year Biomass  Geothermal   
Mine/Sewage
/Landfill Gas   
Solar   Water   
Wind 
Offshore   
Wind 
Onshore 
2015 7.14 0.03 0.64 37.27 1.65 1.68 38.59 
2016 7.15 0.03 0.64 37.40 1.65 3.65 39.71 
2017 7.15 0.03 0.64 39.58 1.76 4.91 41.04 
2018 7.15 0.03 0.64 41.76 1.88 6.17 42.38 
2019 7.15 0.04 0.64 43.94 2.00 7.42 43.71 
2020 6.89 0.03 0.46 46.11 2.12 8.68 41.52 
2021 6.70 0.04 0.40 48.23 2.23 9.94 41.14 
2022 6.71 0.04 0.42 50.15 2.42 10.55 42.64 
2023 6.74 0.04 0.39 52.06 2.60 11.17 43.72 
2024 6.69 0.04 0.36 53.93 2.79 11.78 45.14 
2025 6.37 0.04 0.34 55.29 2.97 12.39 47.31 
2026 5.88 0.04 0.39 56.39 3.16 13.01 49.55 
2027 5.59 0.04 0.39 59.23 3.34 13.62 50.33 
2028 5.42 0.04 0.39 61.64 3.53 14.24 51.54 
2029 5.56 0.04 0.39 63.34 3.70 14.85 53.56 
2030 5.65 0.03 0.39 62.62 3.40 15.43 53.79 
2031 5.58 0.03 0.39 58.63 3.22 16.00 55.20 
2032 4.97 0.04 0.38 57.71 3.21 16.81 57.02 
2033 5.11 0.03 0.38 58.06 3.39 17.65 58.32 
2034 5.28 0.02 0.39 62.15 3.60 18.22 58.95 
2035 5.49 0.02 0.39 68.16 3.88 18.08 58.08 
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Appendix Table A.2 Model Scenario: Yearly average default tariff (Cents/kWh) per technology 
Year Solar Wind 
Onshore 
Wind 
Offshore 
Biomass Mine/Sewage/
Landfill Gas 
Geothermal Water 
2016 11.00 8.90 19.40 17.70 8.20 25.20 11.70 
2017 10.92 8.71 18.83 17.51 8.18 24.58 11.64 
2018 10.84 8.52 18.27 17.32 8.16 23.96 11.59 
2019 10.77 8.33 17.70 17.13 8.13 23.33 11.53 
2020 10.69 8.14 17.13 16.94 8.11 22.71 11.48 
2021 10.61 7.96 16.57 16.76 8.09 22.09 11.42 
2022 10.53 7.77 16.00 16.57 8.07 21.47 11.37 
2023 10.46 7.58 15.43 16.38 8.04 20.84 11.31 
2024 10.38 7.39 14.87 16.19 8.02 20.22 11.26 
2025 10.30 7.20 14.30 16.00 8.00 19.60 11.20 
2026 10.11 7.01 13.96 15.85 8.00 19.16 11.14 
2027 9.92 6.82 13.62 15.70 8.00 18.72 11.08 
2028 9.73 6.63 13.28 15.55 8.00 18.28 11.02 
2029 9.54 6.44 12.94 15.40 8.00 17.84 10.96 
2030 9.35 6.25 12.60 15.25 8.00 17.40 10.90 
2031 9.16 6.06 12.26 15.10 8.00 16.96 10.84 
2032 8.97 5.87 11.92 14.95 8.00 16.52 10.78 
2033 8.78 5.68 11.58 14.80 8.00 16.08 10.72 
2034 8.59 5.49 11.24 14.65 8.00 15.64 10.66 
2035 8.40 5.30 10.90 14.50 8.00 15.20 10.60 
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Appendix Table A.3 Model Scenario: Yearly EEG generation (TWh) per technology 
Year Biomass Geothermal Mine/Sewage
/Landfill Gas  
Solar Water Wind 
Offshore 
Wind 
Onshore 
2015 40.62 0.13 1.42 34.88 5.28 12.56 70.10 
2016 40.63 0.13 1.42 35.95 5.48 17.16 71.75 
2017 40.63 0.14 1.42 37.95 5.86 21.53 73.88 
2018 40.64 0.14 1.42 40.00 6.20 26.74 75.98 
2019 40.64 0.14 1.42 42.04 6.59 30.92 77.99 
2020 38.74 0.14 0.98 44.02 6.96 35.70 72.28 
2021 38.27 0.14 0.91 45.91 7.42 39.26 73.19 
2022 38.57 0.14 0.94 47.68 8.02 41.35 74.32 
2023 38.64 0.15 0.85 49.47 8.64 43.71 75.91 
2024 37.69 0.15 0.80 51.00 9.23 45.85 77.69 
2025 36.03 0.15 0.84 52.19 9.85 48.28 81.35 
2026 33.80 0.15 0.87 53.90 10.41 50.62 82.68 
2027 32.07 0.15 0.87 56.65 11.02 52.84 83.58 
2028 31.77 0.15 0.87 58.59 11.58 54.77 85.41 
2029 32.62 0.14 0.87 59.68 11.91 57.31 86.59 
2030 32.93 0.13 0.87 56.83 10.85 59.40 87.83 
2031 31.76 0.14 0.86 56.17 10.38 61.60 90.53 
2032 28.95 0.14 0.85 54.03 10.68 64.57 92.38 
2033 30.00 0.07 0.86 56.15 11.31 66.89 93.50 
2034 30.63 0.07 0.86 60.50 11.96 69.07 92.86 
2035 32.39 0.06 0.87 67.04 13.02 63.21 91.68 
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Appendix Table A.4 Model Results: Yearly EEG surcharge (Cents/kWh) for privileged and 
unprivileged consumer categories 
Year EEG Surcharge  
(15% Category) 
EEG Surcharge 
(20% Category) 
EEG Surcharge 
(Railways) 
EEG Surcharge 
(Unprivilaged) 
2015 0.68 0.90 0.90 6.37 
2016 0.70 0.93 0.93 6.60 
2017 0.73 0.97 0.97 6.84 
2018 0.75 1.00 1.00 7.09 
2019 0.78 1.04 1.04 7.34 
2020 0.79 1.05 1.05 7.44 
2021 0.81 1.07 1.07 7.59 
2022 0.82 1.09 1.09 7.72 
2023 0.83 1.11 1.11 7.84 
2024 0.83 1.11 1.11 7.82 
2025 0.82 1.10 1.10 7.75 
2026 0.81 1.08 1.08 7.62 
2027 0.79 1.06 1.06 7.47 
2028 0.78 1.04 1.04 7.32 
2029 0.75 1.00 1.00 7.06 
2030 0.69 0.92 0.92 6.48 
2031 0.63 0.84 0.84 5.97 
2032 0.56 0.74 0.74 5.25 
2033 0.52 0.70 0.70 4.92 
2034 0.54 0.71 0.71 5.05 
2035 0.56 0.75 0.75 5.27 
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Appendix B. Data relating to Network Charges Model 
 
Appendix Table B.1 Model Results: Yearly transmission, distribution, services costs and 
aggregated network costs 
Year Transmission Costs 
(Mio. Euros) 
Distribution Costs 
(Mio. Euros) 
Services Costs 
(Mio. Euros) 
Total Network Costs 
(Bio. Euros) 
2015 2895.98 15595.17 1399.51 19.89 
2016 3227.93 15865.71 772.70 19.87 
2017 3554.94 16130.87 737.44 20.42 
2018 3876.99 16390.63 697.72 20.97 
2019 4194.10 16645.00 649.70 21.49 
2020 4506.26 16893.98 583.61 21.98 
2021 4813.48 17137.56 524.99 22.48 
2022 5115.74 17375.76 461.90 22.95 
2023 5413.07 17608.56 394.92 23.42 
2024 5705.44 17835.97 398.88 23.94 
2025 5992.87 18057.99 403.18 24.45 
2026 6275.35 18274.62 406.80 24.96 
2027 6552.88 18485.86 410.69 25.45 
2028 6825.47 18691.71 414.90 25.93 
2029 7093.11 18892.16 419.12 26.40 
2030 7355.80 19087.22 421.66 26.86 
2031 7613.55 19276.90 424.98 27.32 
2032 7866.35 19461.18 427.64 27.76 
2033 8114.20 19640.07 432.17 28.19 
2034 8357.10 19813.56 436.71 28.61 
2035 8595.06 19981.67 439.95 29.02 
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Appendix Table B.2 Model Results: Yearly average network charges for household/SME, 
unprivileged industry and StromNEV-19 surcharge for categories A, B, C in Cents/kWh 
Year Network Charge 
Household/SME 
Network Charge 
Unprevilaged 
Industry 
StromNEV-19 
Surcharge 
Category- A 
StromNEV-19 
Surcharge 
Category-B 
StromNEV-19 
Surcharge 
Category-C 
2015 6.882 2.059 0.388 0.050 0.025 
2016 6.873 2.057 0.387 0.050 0.025 
2017 7.063 2.114 0.399 0.050 0.025 
2018 7.248 2.169 0.411 0.050 0.025 
2019 7.427 2.222 0.422 0.050 0.025 
2020 7.596 2.273 0.432 0.050 0.025 
2021 7.764 2.323 0.442 0.050 0.025 
2022 7.927 2.372 0.452 0.050 0.025 
2023 8.085 2.419 0.462 0.050 0.025 
2024 8.263 2.473 0.473 0.050 0.025 
2025 8.439 2.525 0.484 0.050 0.025 
2026 8.610 2.576 0.495 0.050 0.025 
2027 8.778 2.627 0.505 0.050 0.025 
2028 8.943 2.676 0.515 0.050 0.025 
2029 9.104 2.724 0.525 0.050 0.025 
2030 9.261 2.771 0.535 0.050 0.025 
2031 9.415 2.817 0.544 0.050 0.025 
2032 9.565 2.862 0.554 0.050 0.025 
2033 9.712 2.906 0.563 0.050 0.025 
2034 9.856 2.949 0.572 0.050 0.025 
2035 9.996 2.991 0.580 0.050 0.025 
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Appendix C. Data relating to KWKG model 
 
Appendix Table C.1 Dataset from (Öko-Institut, 2015) featuring yearly additional capacities in 
MWs coming under KWKG support mechanism categorized as per category M, C1, C2, C3 
Year Cat-M Cat-C1 Cat-C2 Cat-C3 
2009 94 260 115 55 
2010 166 427 134 40 
2011 23 335 173 52 
2012 211 266 195 53 
2013 796 295 242 62 
2014 836 400 324 81 
 
Appendix Table C.2 Model Results: Aggregated yearly installed capacities, generation, costs and 
KWKG surcharge values as resulted from model calculations 
Year Installed Capacity 
(GW) 
KWK Generation 
(TWh) 
Support Cost 
(Mio. Euros) 
Base KWKG-Surcharge 
(Cents/kWh) 
2017 10307 33 1047 0.3885 
2018 12260 39 1239 0.4597 
2019 13296 43 1313 0.4872 
2020 13507 43 1329 0.4929 
2021 13507 43 1329 0.4932 
2022 13507 43 1330 0.4934 
2023 13507 43 1330 0.4934 
2024 13507 43 1330 0.4934 
2025 13507 43 1330 0.4934 
2026 13507 43 1330 0.4934 
2027 13507 43 1330 0.4934 
2028 13507 43 1330 0.4934 
2029 13507 43 1330 0.4934 
2030 13507 43 1330 0.4934 
2031 13507 43 1330 0.4934 
2032 13507 43 1330 0.4934 
2033 13507 43 1330 0.4934 
2034 13507 43 1330 0.4934 
2035 13507 43 1330 0.4934 
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